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Do we have any idiom in English stating such a concept? "the problem got so bad/complex that it cannot be solved anymore"
closed as off-topic by , , Rathony, ♦,
This question appears to be off-topic. The users who voted to close gave this specific reason:&Questions on choosing an ideal word or phrase must include information on how it will be used in order to be answered. For help writing a good word or phrase request, see: & & NVZ, Community, chosterIf this question can be reworded to fit the rules in the , please .
You may use the idiomatic expression :
a situation that is hard to deal with or get out of : a situation that is full of problems.
That was six months ago, when the Defense secretary laughingly dismissed the idea that Iraq was, or could turn into, a quagmire.
(informal) a situation in which no further progress can be made.
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For not very formal use, and in the vein of IvanSanchez's answer but which is arguably a little stronger: FUBAR. "That thing is FUBAR'd". It's an acronym that stands for
recognition
Since the situation is now "beyond all recognition", it is deemed impossible to solve.
was doomed to push a rock up a hill only for it to roll down every night. From this we get the concept of a .
There are many colloquial phrases perhaps derived in spirit from this myth, for tasks which can't be completed, for example pushing water uphill with a rake and nailing jelly to a wall. These are quite common in UK engineering circles.
If it was impossible when it was given to you and your manager knew it but you didn't, the effect on your career might be serious. In this case the phrase
would be applicable. Strictly this lacks the sense of impossibility of fixing solving the problem, but a solution wouldn't be a success.
7,93221936
I would simply say
or (thank you @OrangeDog) . As @JohnWaylandBales replied you also have
but you were asking for "cannot be solved" not "hard to solve".
There is an interesting word for a problem so hard to solve within its (usually implied) rules but so important that someone breaks those rules in order to obtain a solution: .
I would say , military slang for <>. The problem/situation is horrible, but it's been so for long enough as to be accepted as the normal situation.
A project that has gotten so difficult as to be impossible is sometimes called a death march.
In project management, a death march is a project where the members feel it is destined to fail, or requires a stretch of unsustainable overwork. The general feel of the project reflects that of an actual death march because the members of the project are forced to continue the project by their superiors against their better judgment.
"Your project is doomed"
marked for certain death
"the black spot told the old sailor he was doomed"
marked by or promising bad fortune
"their business venture was doomed from the start"
Forlorn hope &
An undertaking that seems very unlikely to succeed.
"This plan you have is a forlorn hope and will never work out the way you want"
Lost cause &
a hopeless matter.
"Our campaign to have the new party on the ballot was a lost cause."
"Todd gave it up as a lost cause."
Losing battle &
15.7k94591
The problem has become intractable.
One more option is:
The problem is incurable.
This metaphorical expression likens the problem to a disease that cannot be cured, and is especially suitable in situations where the problem has gotten worse over time or is too difficult to eliminate without causing harm or further problems, like some terminal illnesses.
Another option is:
The problem has spread like wildfire.
This clearly is applicable to problems that can spread quickly and cannot be easily doused. Not surprisingly, people who try to quell such problems are often described as trying to douse the issue.
Well if you want to make sure nobody but computing scientists understand you, you could always say:
The problem is NP-complete.
But this actually means that you can devise a way (an algorithm) that would in theory solve the problem, but in practice it would take an infinite (or impractically long) time.
Gordian Knot
Is used to signify an i
legend of Phrygian Gordium associated with Alexander the Great. It is often used as a metaphor for an intractable problem (disentangling an "impossible" knot) solved easily by loophole or "thinking outside the box" ("cutting the Gordian knot"):
There are several that connote having only bad choices available:
"Catch 22" (taken from the title of the book of the same name).
"between a rock and a hard place"
"damned if I do, damned if I don't."
"Tool-blocked" refers to a bolt or screw that is impossible to remove because the necessary tool won't fit or work in the space the fastener is in. It could be used metaphorically to mean a problem that you could try to solve but you would get in your own way.
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English Language & Usage Stack Exchange works best with JavaScript enabledIs there no escape from the euro? | The Cobden Centre
As I , the costs and risks of maintaining the system
are already immense and rising. So is an exit possible? Intuitively,
the exit from the euro should be as easy as the entrance. Joining and
leaving the club should be equally simple. Leaving is just undoing what
was done before. Indeed, many popular articles discuss the prospects of
an exit of countries such as Greece or Germany. However, other voices have rightly argued that there are important exit
problems. Some authors even argue that these problems would make an
exit from the euro virtually impossible. Thus, Eichengreen (2010)
states, “The decision to join the euro area is effectively
irreversible.” Similarly, Porter (2010) argues that the large costs of
an exit would make it highly unlikely. In the following we address the
alleged exit problems.
Legal Problems
The does not provide for a mechanism to exit the European Monetary Union ().
Thus, several authors maintain that an exit from the euro would
constitute a breach of the treaties (Cotterill 2011, Procter and
Thieffry 1998, Thieffry 2011, Anthanassiou 2009). In an
working paper from 2009 Anthanassiou claims that a country that exits the EMU would have to leave the
as well. As the allows for secession from the EU, withdrawal from the EU would be the only way to get rid of the euro.
The solution to this legal problem could be an exit from both the EMU
and EU with an immediate reentering of the EU. This procedure could be
negotiated beforehand. In the case of a net contributor to the EU budget
such as Germany, the country would probably not face any problem
getting immediately readmitted to the EU.
In any case, the referral to the Maastricht Treaty when discussing
the legal possibility of exit is intriguing, because the Maastricht
Treaty, especially the “no-bailout clause,” has been violated through
the bailouts of Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. The
effectively serves to guarantee debts of other nations, not to mention the plans to introduce eurobonds.
In addition, the European Central Bank has violated the spirit of the
Maastricht Treaty by purchasing debt of troubled nations. It seems to
be a justification, if not an obligation, to leave the euro after the
conditions for its existence have been violated. Indeed, the German Constitutional Court ruled in 1993 that Germany
could leave the euro if the goals of monetary stability were not
attained (Scott 1998, p. 215). After the last couple of years, it is
clear that the eurozone and the euro are far from stable. Apart from
these considerations it should be noted that a sovereign state can
repudiate the treaty (Deo, Donovan, and Hatheway 2011).
Another legal problem results from the possible redenomination of
contracts in the wake of an exit from the euro. A government may
redenominate euro contracts into the new currency (applying lex monetae — the state determines its own currency). It may do so without problems
if the contracts were contracted in its territory or under its law. But
what about private and public bonds issued in foreign countries? How
would foreign courts rule (Scott 1998, p. 224)?
Imagine a German company that sold a bond in Paris. Will the bond be
paid back in euros or in the new currency if Germany leaves the euro?
The French court would probably decide that it can or must be paid back
in euros. Possibly also the European Court of Justice would rule on such issues.
Thus, in the case of an exit, there would be some uncertainty caused by
court settlements. There may be one-time losses or profits for the
involved parties. However, it is hard to see why these court rulings
would constitute important disturbances or insurmountable obstacles for a
euro exit.
Introduction Costs
An exit from the euro may imply the issuing of a new national
currency. This involves the costs of printing new notes, melting new
coins, exchanging vendor machines, etc. There are also logistic costs
exchanging the new currency against the old one. These costs are not
higher than the costs of introducing the euro. The costs for introducing
the euro in Austria have been estimated at EUR1.45 billion euros or
around 0.5 percent of GDP.
Wage Inflation and Higher Interest Rates
Sometimes it is argued that peripheral countries with uncompetitive
wages could just exit the euro and magically solve all their problems.
Greece, for instance, suffers from too-high wages mainly because there
is no free labor market. Labor unions have caused wages to be too high.
The resulting unemployment had been attenuated by government deficit
spending and debt accumulation made possible by the . The Greek government employed people at high wages, paid unemployment benefits and retired people early with high pensions.
As strong labor unions prevent wages from falling to recuperate
competitiveness, some people recommend that Greece exit the euro,
depreciate the currency, and thereby increase competitiveness. This
argument contains a problem. If labor unions remain strong, they may
simply demand wage increases to compensate for higher import prices
(Eichengreen 2010, p. 8). Such a compensatory increase in wages would
eliminate all advantages from depreciation. The exit would have to be accompanied by a reform of the labor market
in order to improve competitiveness. In any case, after an exit from the
EMU, the Greek government could no longer use EMU monetary
redistribution and deficit spending to push up wages artificially.
Similarly, an exit without further reforms could lead to a
repudiation of government debt. This would imply higher interest rates
for the government in the future (Eichengreen 2008, p. 10). An
accompanying reform of fiscal institutions such a constitutional limits
for budget deficits could alleviate this problem.
The End of Monetary Redistribution between Countries
Some countries benefit from the monetary setup of the EMU. They pay
lower interest rates on their debts than they otherwise would. If a
country like Greece exits the euro and repays its debts with a devalued
new currency, it will have to pay higher interest rates for its debts.
In addition, countries such as Greece could no longer benefit from
the monetary redistribution. The Greek government, and indirectly part
of the Greek population, benefits from the high Greek deficits and the
flow of new money into the country. This process allowed Greece to
finance an import surplus and standard of living it would not have
achieved otherwise. At least in the short term, an exit from the euro
would, ceteris paribus, mean a deterioration of artificially high living
standards. In other words, after an exit from the EMU, the size of its
public sector and standard of living would likely fall as the EMU
subsidies end. These redistribution costs only apply to countries that
have been on the receiving end of the redistribution. For fiscally
sounder countries, the opposite reasoning applies.
Trade Losses
Some authors argue that European trade would collapse in the wake of a
euro exit. Trade barriers would be re-erected. In any case there could
be an appreciation of the new currency like a new deutschemark (DM). In a
research paper, Flury and Wacker (2010, p. 3) estimate that the new DM would appreciate about 25 percent.
In contrast to another UBS research paper (Deo, Donovan and Hatheway 2011) that comes up with horrific costs of a euro break up, we do not regard such trade barriers as very likely for several
reasons. First, such barriers would be an economic disaster for all
involved parties and would lead to a severe and long depression and a
reduction of living standards. Second, net contributors to the EU, such
as Germany, could still use their contributions to the EU budget as a
negotiating card to prevent such barriers. Third, trade barriers are a
blatant violation of EU treaties. Fourth, tariffs could provoke severe
tensions between nations, possibly leading to war.
Political Costs
Sometimes it is maintained that an exit implies high political costs.
Most importantly, an exit could trigger the dissolution of the euro. The disintegration of the EMU could endanger the development of a
federal European state. At least, it would mean an important blow to the
“European project.” It could mean the end of the EU as we know today.
The EU could “degenerate” into a free-trade zone.
Politicians of the exiting country would lose influence on the
policies of other EMU countries. The politicians of the exiting country
would also lose appreciation of other EMU politicians and in the
mainstream media that has supported the euro staunchly. However, for
supporters of a free-trade zone in Europe, these political costs imply
immense benefits. The danger of a federal European state would disappear
Procedural Costs and Capital Flows
An exiting nation has to print new notes, mint new coins, reprogram
automatic teller machines, and rewrite computer code (Eichengreen 2008,
p. 17). This takes time. The case of machines may not be tragic, because,
during the transition period, old machines may be in use without chaos. A
public parking place using euro coins will not bring the economy down.
The notes-and-coins problem has a fast solution, because on both the
country’s origin is visible. Coins have a country-specific image and
notes bear a country-specific letter. In a German exit from the euro,
all German coins and notes would be redenominated into the new currency
and later gradually exchanged into the new notes and coins. Of course, the transition period would involve some checking costs as
people have to look at the symbols when transacting in cash.
The most severe problem of a euro exit — one that according to
Eichengreen (2010) would pose “insurmountable” barriers — is capital
flows when the option of exiting is discussed. Such a discussion takes time in democracies. During this time there may be important capital inflows and outflows.
Let us first discuss the problem of capital outflow such as in the
case of an exit of Greece with no accompanying reforms. If Greek senior
politicians seriously discuss an exit from the euro, Greek citizens will
expect a depreciation of the new currency, a new drachma. Greek
citizens will transfer their euros held at Greek banks to accounts in
other EMU countries. They will probably not turn in their euro notes to
be exchanged for the new drachmas voluntarily.
Greek citizens may also acquire other currencies such as Swiss
francs, US dollars, or gold to protect themselves from depreciation. In
this way Greece could practically be immunized against the new drachma
even before its introduction. As a consequence, the Greek banking system
may get into liquidity and solvency problems. Meanwhile, Greek citizens
would continue to transact in euros held outside Greek jurisdiction.
This is the so-called “problem” of capital outflows. Yet these
outflows are not a problem for ordinary Greek citizens. For them these
outflows are a solution to the problem of an inflationary national
currency. Moreover, capital outflows are already occurring. The
discussion in parliament of a Greek exit would only speed up what is
happening already.
The opposite reasoning applies when a more solvent country like
Germany discusses an exit from the eurozone. If people expect an
appreciation of a newly introduced currency, there would be capital
inflows into Germany. The money supply of euros within Germany, which
would later be converted into a new currency, would increase. Prices of
German assets (e.g., housing and stocks) would increase in advance of
the actual German exit, benefitting the current owners of such assets.
A Systemic Banking Crisis
Finally, there may be negative feedback for the banking system as
there will most likely be losses for banks both domestic and foreign., Eichengreen (2010) fears the “mother of all financial crises.” Due to
connectivity, it does not matter if Germany or Greece leaves the euro.
If Greece leaves the euro and pays back its government bonds in a
depreciated new currency or defaults outright, there will be losses for
European banks that could get into solvency problems. Similarly, if
Germany leaves the euro, the implicit guarantee and support to the
Eurosystem will disappear. The result may be a banking crisis in Greece
and other countries. The banking crisis might negatively affect German
banks. The banking crisis would also negatively affect sovereigns, due to
possible bank recapitalizations. Other countries may be regarded as
possible defaulters or exit candidates leading to higher interest rates
on public debts. A systemic financial crisis infecting weak governments
would be likely (Boone and Johnson 2011).
Recently, the
suggested that European banks face EUR300 billion in potential losses and urged the banks to raise capital. We should emphasize that the problem of bank undercapitalization and
bad assets (most importantly, peripheral government bonds) does already
exist in the EMU and will deteriorate without an exit.
It is almost impossible to leave the euro without already-unstable
structures collapsing. Yet this collapse would have the beneficial
effect of quickly purging unsustainable structures. Even if there are no
exits from the euro, the banking problem exists and will have to be
solved sooner or later. Potential bank insolvency should therefore be no
argument against an exit. In the EMU taxpayers (mostly German) and inflationary measures by the
ECB are momentarily containing the situation. An exit would speed up a
restructuring of the European banking system.
At this point I would like to give the following recommendation for a
solution of the banking crisis. There are important free-market
solutions to bank-solvency problems.
Banks with nonviable business models should be allowed to fail, liberating capital and resources for other business projects.
A debt-to-equity conversion may put many banks on a healthy basis.
Banks may collect private capital by issuing equity, as they are already doing.
A free-market reform has important advantages:
Taxpayers are not hurt.
Unsustainable banking projects are resolved. As the banking sector
is oversized, it would shrink to a more healthy and sustainable level.
No inflationary policies are used to sustain the banking system.
Moral hazard is avoided. Banks will not be bailed out.
The Problem of Disentangling the European Central Bank
The Eurosystem consists of the ECB and national central banks. The
task of disentangling is facilitated because national central banks
still possess their own reserves and have their own balance sheets.
Scott (1998) argues that this setup may have been intentional. Countries
wanted to retain the possibility of leaving the euro if necessary.
On January 1, 1999, the ECB started with capital of EUR5 billion. In
December 2010 the capital was increased from EUR5.76 billion to EUR10.76
Only part of all EMU reserve assets have been pooled in the ECB,
making a disentangling easier. On January 1, 1999, national central
banks provided EUR50 billion in reserve assets pro rata to their capital
contribution (Procter and Thieffrey 1998, p. 6). National central banks
retained the “ownership” of these foreign reserve assets and transferred
the management of the reserves to the ECB. (Scott 1998, p. 217). In the
case of an exit, both the return of the contribution to the ECB’s
capital and the foreign assets transferred to the Eurosystem had to be
negotiated (Anthanassiou 2009).
Similarly, there is the problem of TARGET2 claims and liabilities. If Germany had left the EMU in March 2012, the Bundesbank would have
found TARGET2 claims denominated in euros of more than EUR616 billion on
its balance sheet. If the euro depreciated against the new DM, important losses for the
Bundesbank would result. As a consequence, the German government may have to recapitalize the
Bundesbank. Take into account, however, that these losses would only
acknowledge the risk and losses that the Bundesbank and the German
treasury are facing within the EMU. This risk is rising every day the
Bundesbank stays within the EMU.
If, in contrast, Greece leaves the EMU, it would be less problematic
for the departing country. Greece would simply pay its credits to the
ECB with the new drachmas, involving losses for the ECB. Depositors
would move their accounts from Greek banks to German banks leading to
TARGET2 claims for the Bundesbank. As the credit risk of the Bundesbank
would keep increasing due to TARGET2 surpluses, the Bundesbank might
well want to pull the plug on the euro itself (Brookes 1998).
Intellectual honesty requires us to admit that there are important
costs to exiting the euro, such as legal problems or the disentangling
of the ECB. However, these costs can be mitigated by reforms or clever
handling. Some of the alleged costs are actually benefits from the point
of liberty, such as political costs or liberating capital flows.
Indeed, other costs may be seen as an opportunity, such as a banking
crisis that is used to reform the financial system and finally put it on
a sound basis. In any case, these costs have to be compared with the
enormous benefits of exiting the system, consisting in the possible
implosion of the Eurosystem. Exiting the euro implies ending being part
of an inflationary, self-destructing monetary system with growing
welfare states, falling competitiveness, bailouts, subsidies, transfers,
moral hazard, conflicts between nations, centralization, and in general
a loss of liberty.
Reiermann (2011) discusses rumors of a possible Greek exit. Desmond
Lachman (2011) maintains that Greece exit from the eurozone is
inevitable. Feldstein (2010) recommends that Greece take a “holiday”
from the euro. Johnson (2011) and Roubini (2011) recommend that Greece
leave the euro and default. Alexandre (2011) and Knowles (2011) wonder
how a Greek exit could be achieved. Edmund Conway (2011), on the
contrary, thinks that Germany should leave the eurozone. David Champion
(2011) also considers the possibility of a German exit.
Smits (2005, p. 464) writes, “There is no legal way for a separate exit
from the eurozone. So, an intention to give up the single currency can
only be realized by negotiating an exit agreement, or, failing
successful conclusion thereof, leaving [the EU altogether] after the
two-year notice period.”
Anthanassiou (2009, p. 19), in contrast, argues that no country can leave the eurozone in protest.
Mann (1960) maintains that if it is unclear which currency should be
applied, the courts should use the law specified in the contract. So if
the bond of the German company is sold in Paris under French law, the
contract would be paid in euros. Porter (2010, p. 4) reaches the same
conclusion.
Thieffry (2011, p. 104) fears a “serious legal dislocation of
government bond markets and a long period of uncertainty.” Problems for
irresponsible governments to finance deficit spending might actually be
seen as advantageous.
See Newsat (2001).
The argument of increased competitiveness via depreciation has more
fundamental problems (Rallo 2011, p.158). While it is important to lower
some prices vis-à-vis the foreign world (e.g., wages in some sectors),
depreciation lowers all prices to the same extent. Moreover, it makes
imports more expensive. If a country has to import commodities and goods
that are later exported, the depreciation may not increase
competitiveness at all.
The authors estimate the costs for “weak” countries to leave between
EUR9,500 and EUR11,500 per person and EUR6,000 to EUR8,000 per person for
“strong” countries. The authors contrast these numbers with the
relatively small cost of EUR1,000 per German in the case of a 50 percent
haircut on Greek government debt. These estimations neglect some
important benefits of exit and exaggerate the costs. For instance, they
do not take into account the long-term costs of a fiscal union, nor the
higher inflation. Moreover, they assume that the “strong” leaving
country would have to “write off its export industry” and civil disorder
in weak countries, while the possibility of such disorder it actually
higher staying within the eurozone.
On the history of the political project of the euro as a means toward a central European state see .
Flury and Wacker (2010) estimate one year of transition to fully establish the new currency.
An alternative solution would be to stamp all notes in the exiting
country within a short period of time. Yet, there is the problem of
massive inflow of notes or a population that does not bring in their
notes to be stamped due to fear of future depreciation. Thus, we regard
the exchange of notes bearing the national letter more practical, even
though some of the notes are circulating in other EMU countries.
Smith (2005, p. 465) points to the instability caused by speculations
about an exit: “even the threat of withdrawal will affect the euro
stability and may lead to speculation against the single currency.”
Scott (1998, p. 211) argues that speculation on which country is to
leave may lead to a breakup of the eurozone.
Porter (2010, p.6 ) depicts the following scenario: If Germany is
expected to introduce a strong currency. banks will transfer deposits to
Germany. They could lend at the marginal lending rate of their central
banks and deposit at the Bundesbank. The Bundesbank balance sheet would
expand substantially. Porter suggests a surprise shut down of the
Another alleged problem is contagion. If one country leaves the
eurozone, investors may sell the debt of other weak EMU governments and
their banks triggering more exits. The contagion problem does not
concern us here, because we want to discuss the possibility of exit. If
exit is possible and desirable, contagion is no insurmountable problem
but may even be recommendable.
As Porter (2010, p. 5) points out, an exit would result in a currency
mismatch of many companies and banks. Suddenly they would have assets or
debts denominated in a foreign currency with a changing value resulting
in windfall profits or losses. As Germany has a net foreign-asset
position and an exit would likely lead to an appreciation of the new
German currency, losses would result. The losses would damage balance
Flury and Wacker (2010) discuss this and other problems related to a German exit from the euro.
See Reddy (2011).
One may also ask whether a country should have rejected the possibility
of secession from the Soviet Union in fear of banking problems.
For a detailed plan and critique of the 2008 bailouts, see Bagus and Rallo (2011).
Ideally, this conversion would be voluntary. If bank creditors are
unwilling to convert their investments into equity, the bank would have
to be liquidated with high losses due to fire sales. Thus, there is an
incentive for creditors to convert bank debts into equity, if the
business model is be viable. Doing so they can prevent the higher losses
from a liquidation. On the contrary, Buiter (2008) has suggested an
involuntary, across-the-board debt-equity conversion. This measure is
unnecessary if we allow for bank failures.
The Bundesbank capital share is 27.1 percent. The paid up capital is
EUR1.4 billion. (The Bundesbank’s capital share is 18.93 percent including
both eurozone and noneurozone members.)
A depreciation of the euro implies a loss of almost EUR100 billion.
Note that the claims or liabilities in the TARGET2 system are not
against other national central banks, but a single net bilateral
position is established vis-á-vis the ECB only (Whittaker 2011). See
also Bundesbank (2011b, p. 34).
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This is a very well written and researched article however there is on point I want to pick you up on.
“Finally, there may be negative feedback for the banking system as there will most likely be losses for banks both domestic and foreign.”
It is possible that systems analysis will have lost control of its terminology before much longer. What you are discribing is possitive feedback!
Possitive feedback accentuates an anomaly
Negative feedback corrects an anomaly
In the context of banking and stock markets negative feedback is a “good thing” that stabilises markets. Possitive feedback is a “bad thing” that can cause systemic breakdown.
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