Access denied | www.mendeley.com used Cloudflare to restrict access
Please enable cookies.
What happened?
The owner of this website (www.mendeley.com) has banned your access based on your browser's signature (425cf4c81d3b6c2e-ua98).Distributional Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
The NCBI web site requires JavaScript to function.Tartuffe and Other Plays (Signet Classics)-Kindle商店-亚马逊中国
iPhone/iPad/Mac
Android手机或平板电脑
请输入您的手机号码，获取Kindle阅读软件的下载链接。
Kindle电子书价格:
这些促销将适用于该商品：
部分促销可以同时享受；部分促销不可与其他促销同时享受。更多详情请查看促销条款。
发送至您的Kindle设备或Kindle阅读软件
发送至您的Kindle设备或Kindle阅读软件
加入心愿单
无法加入到心愿单。请重试。
Tartuffe and Other Plays (Signet Classics)
Kindle电子书
广告
亚马逊价格
全新品最低价
非全新品最低价
Kindle电子书
Seven plays by the genius of French theater.
Including The Ridiculous Precieuses, The School for Husbands, The School for Wives, Don Juan, The Versailles Impromptu, and The Critique of the School for Wives, this collection showcases the talent of perhaps the greatest and best-loved French playwright.Translated and with an Introduction by Donald M. Frame
With a Foreword by Virginia Scott And a New Afterword by Charles NewellFrom the Paperback edition.
生词提示功能:
更先进的排版模式:
语种： 英语
第 1 页, 共 1 页
这项购物功能将继续加载商品。要导航到此轮盘之外，请使用您的标题快捷键，导航到之前或之后的标题。
John Ciardi
Kindle电子书
Fyodor Do …
Kindle电子书
Henrik Ibsen
Kindle电子书
William F …
Kindle电子书
发售日期: 日
Seven plays by the genius of French theater.
Including The Ridiculous Precieuses, The School for Husbands, The School for Wives, Don Juan, The Versailles Impromptu, and The Critique of the School for Wives, this collection showcases the talent of perhaps the greatest and best-loved French playwright.Translated and with an Introduction by Donald M. Frame
With a Foreword by Virginia Scott And a New Afterword by Charles NewellFrom the Paperback edition.
Seven plays by the genius of French theater.
Including The Ridiculous Precieuses, The School for Husbands, The School for Wives, Don Juan, The Versailles Impromptu, and The Critique of the School for Wives, this collection showcases the talent of perhaps the greatest and best-loved French playwright.Translated and with an Introduction by Donald M. Frame
With a Foreword by Virginia Scott And a New Afterword by Charles NewellFrom the Paperback edition.
版本： Kindle电子书
文件大小： 1494 KB
纸书页数： 347
出版社: Signet (日)
语种： 英语
ASIN: B00PT4IY9G
标准语音朗读：
生词提示功能: 已启用
亚马逊热销商品排名:
Kindle商店商品里排第301,530名 ()
5 星 (0%)0%4 星4 星 (0%)0%3 星3 星 (0%)0%2 星2 星 (0%)0%1 星1 星 (0%)0%与其他买家分享您的想法
Terry Black5.0 颗星，最多 5 颗星Five Stars -
已在美国亚马逊上发表已确认购买aThomas Banks5.0 颗星，最多 5 颗星A man of genius -
已在美国亚马逊上发表已确认购买Everyone should read "Tartuffe," at the very least. Moliere was a gift for the ages, and this translation makes him easily accessible for those of us who struggle with French.
1 个人发现此评论有用.
Kami5.0 颗星，最多 5 颗星Great play! -
已在美国亚马逊上发表已确认购买Tartuffe has always been one of my favorite plays as well as Moliere one of my favorite authors.
A great book!
1 个人发现此评论有用.
Patricia A. Lemmermann5.0 颗星，最多 5 颗星Tartuffe and other plays -
已在美国亚马逊上发表I purchased this book for my daughter who is a sophomore in college. It was the right version..apparently there is another version of this play that is not written correctly. It was delivered in a timely manner and was just what I expected.
1 个人发现此评论有用.
<iframe name="iFrameHMD" id="iFrameHMD" height="0" width="0" style="border:none" src="javascript:''">
如果您需要联系客户服务获取帮助或解答问题，。
您是否想要报告这本书的质量或排版问题？
您认为该书有不恰当内容吗？
您认为这个商品侵犯了版权吗？
查看产品详情页面完毕后，在此处了解返回您感兴趣的页面的方式。
查看产品详情页面完毕后，在此处了解返回您感兴趣的页面的方式。Page not found (404)
Our apologies. We can't find the page you are looking for. For further assistance, please feel free to &.Multinational Monitor
Multinational Monitor
MAR/APR 2005
VOL 26 No. 3
by Emily Gottlieb
by Andrew Wheat
by Carmen Balber
by Darshana Patel
by Michele Simon
by Luke Reynolds
by Anastasia Moloney
INTERVIEW:
an interview with Richard Daynard
DEPARTMENTS:
Bringing Justice to Big Business
The Wolfowitz Card - Australia's Oil Grab
Unfair Competition: Big Business Succeeds in Gutting California's Landmark Consumer Protection Law
California&s Unfair Competition Law was the strongest consumer protection
law of its kind in the United States when Proposition 64 drastically
scaled it back this past November.
The initiative, which passed by a 59-to-41 percent margin, eliminated the
ability of any Californian to use the Unfair Competition Law to prevent
unfair, deceptive or illegal acts by a business. The law now requires an
individual to have personally lost &money or property& in order to bring
a company to court and stop an unfair practice. Proposition 64 also did
away with suits to prevent any harm that is not measured in dollars, like
loss of health, environmental damage or consumer deception.
One key question about the measure has not been answered: How were
California voters convinced to cede these protections at the ballot?
California&s largest consumer, environmental, labor, attorney, senior and
public health organizations united to oppose Prop 64. Seventy-five public
interest groups formed the coalition opposing Proposition 64, including
the American Civil Liberties Union, the Sierra Club, AARP, Consumers
Union, the California Labor Federation & AFL-CIO, the California Nurses
Association, Consumer Attorneys of California, the American Lung
Association and the Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights.
The initiative&s proponents were a &Who&s Who& of Corporate America and
included 43 companies and industry groups that have had, or now have,
legal troubles under the Unfair Competition Law. These bad actors alone
gave $5.2 million to Proposition 64, including:
The Oil Industry & $465,000 donors to Prop. 64, was forced to clean up
groundwater polluted with the gasoline additive MTBE, and stop air
pollution from an oil refinery that was ca
Big Tobacco & $200,000 donor to Prop. 64, was held responsible for lying
to the public about the health e
Auto Manufacturers and Car Dealers & $2,116,100 donors to Prop. 64, have
faced suits to stop dealers from charging illegal finance mark-ups, often
The Financial Industry & $365,000 donors to Prop. 64, has been charged
with illegally seizing Social Security money from elderly and disabled
clients, and predato
Insurance Companies & $450,000 donors to Prop. 64, had to repay
customers they fraudulently denied earthquak and,
Health Care Giants& $979,500 donors to Prop. 64, including
pharmaceutical companies accused of illegally using consumers& private
medical information, and HMOs who denied approval of medically necessary
care to delay or avoid payment.
Most of the suits forcing these corporations to make amends for
mistreating consumers or despoiling the environment would never have
gotten off the ground if Proposition 64 had been law when they were
How Proposition 64 Passed
The lessons of the campaign should influence how future battles are
fought. Money, messengers and popular misconceptions gave the Proposition
64 victory to its big industry backers.
Lesson No. 1: TV works: The Yes campaign branded Proposition 64 the
&Shakedown Lawsuit& initiative.
Proposition 64&s big business backers had a critical advantage that only
money can buy & advertising time. The No On 64 campaign was outspent five
A $15 million war chest allowed Yes On 64 to begin airing statewide
television ads early in September. The $3 million No campaign hit the
airwaves with less than three weeks before Election Day. Trial attorneys
were the primary funders of the No TV ads, in coalition with public
interest groups, including the Consumer Federation of California, Sierra
Club California and the California Nurses Association.
An extra month on television branded Proposition 64 the &Shakedown
Lawsuit& initiative before voters ever saw an opposing view. By the time
the No campaign was on TV, it could not overcome the din of 15 other
initiatives, local races and the presidential contest all competing for
the public&s attention.
One reason for the staggering imbalance of funds is that trial attorneys,
who were the likeliest deep pockets to fight such an initiative, do not
make their money on the kind of public protection lawsuits that were the
target of Proposition 64. The initiative&s big industry backers chose the
one issue that would limit their liability in court & weakening the
Unfair Competition Law & but not financially threaten lawyers to goad
them into fully financing the fight. The nonprofit groups opposing
Proposition 64 did not have the millions of dollars it takes to finance a
mass media campaign in California. Attorneys underestimated the fight,
and refused to give it the attention it deserved.
Lesson No. 2: Small business owners were the face of Proposition 64.
Yes On 64 television ads made small business owners struggling under
unjust lawsuits the face of the campaign, even though big business was
driving it. Actors portraying an auto mechanic or the owner of an
&innovative company& complained, &Businesses like mine pay a fortune to
lawyers filing frivolous lawsuits,& and worried, &If these lawyers aren&t
stopped, businesses like mine could be run out of the state.&
These claims stemmed from summer 2003, when three lawyers in Beverly
Hills were caught sending extortion letters to small business owners,
threatening to sue using the Unfair Competition Law unless the attorneys
were paid to drop the case. The owners of small nail salons, restaurants
and auto repair shops often paid these swindlers rather than face the
higher cost and uncertainty of fighting them in court. When their
activity was discovered, the Attorney General went after the offending
torneys and an investigation by the state bar led to their disbarment.
Nevertheless, initiative proponents seized upon the issue and made
suffering small business owners the public face of the Yes campaign.
Proposition 64 failed to do anything to protect businesses from
unscrupulous attorneys because it went after the law, not lawyers who
abuse it. Initiative proponents actually dismissed legislative solutions
to the problem & including proposals that would have increased
transparency and judicial review to expose and punish lawyers who sent
illegal demand letters.
Lesson No. 3: The public did not see who was really behind Proposition 64.
California Attorney General Bill Lockyer asserted, &The proponents try to
disguise Prop. 64 as a small-business protection measure needed to
eliminate &shakedown& lawsuits. But the initiative&s primary backers
hardly qualify as a coalition of mom-and-pop enterprises. They rank among
the largest companies in the world, with annual profits in the hundreds
of billions of dollars.&
Public interest opponents to Proposition 64 ran a vigorous earned media
campaign, launching a statewide press tour to expose Proposition 64&s
corporate backers and the benefits they expected from its passage. A
15-foot-tall inflatable cigarette box with a &Public Health Warning: No
On 64& message was the backdrop to the 15-city tour in the weeks before
the election. Press conferences were held at the doorsteps of corporate
donors who had been held accountable for unfair practices to highlight
the public interest cases Proposition 64 would ban.
However, this message and the Surgeon General-style public health warning
only reached viewers of nightly newscasts. The campaign&s paid
advertisements did not include it, and most voters never heard about the
initiative&s big industry contributors or what they would gain from
Proposition 64. In the end, initiative battles boil down to
finger-pointing: Proposition 64&s proponents pointed the finger at
lawyers far better than opponents pointed out its big business backers.
Lesson No. 4: Big business efforts to obscure its role in gutting the
Unfair Competition Law are part of a concerted strategy.
As Philip Morris, a $200,000 donor to Proposition 64, explained in a 1994
internal memo: &Our success in the tort battles in the past two years has
resulted in part from our ability to find non-tobacco industry messengers
to lead the fight. [Success] will come in part from our ability to
complement the inside political skills of the tobacco lobbyists with the
more acceptable public face of key business association or coalition
Lesson No. 5: Polls don&t tell you everything.
Proposition 64 was behind in the polls throughout the campaign. The first
Field Poll released in August showed the initiative 20 points behind,
with 41 percent opposed and just 21 percent in favor. Proposition 64
remained 12 points behind in late September, even after Yes on 64
advertising began airing. Private tracking polls showed the same trend.
Fundraising against the measure was weak in part because polls predicting
the initiative&s defeat lulled its opponents into complacency. The gap
narrowed a few days before the election, when a late October Field Poll
reported the measure just five points behind. By that time, it was too
late to raise more money and increase the No campaign&s paid media
Over-reliance on internal polling further hurt the No On 64 campaign by
giving it the wrong message for its ad campaign. Clean air and water poll
well with all Californians. So do groups associated with protecting
public health. Adhering to conclusions drawn from these polls, No On 64&s
paid media focused on an environmental message but did not identify the
corporate backers of Proposition 64. Clarifying the sides may have been
enough to dissuade the public from believing the measure would help small
businesses. Instead, opponents produced advertisements warning that: &The
American Lung Association of California, Sierra Club & California Nurses
all oppose Prop. 64. Why? Because Prop. 64 will take your breath away.
Prop. 64 suffocates their ability to enforce tobacco and public health
laws. & No on Prop. 64. Our health depends on it.&
Any person concerned about childhood asthma, dirty drinking water or
unsafe automobiles would have been a compelling No On 64 messenger, but
no such person made it on the air. The public didn&t see the initiative&s
backers, nor did they see the face of Proposition 64&s victims. No On 64
produced ads with no villain and no victim that failed to counter the Yes
side&s small business disguise.
Lesson No. 6: Lawyers have a bad rep.
Public antagonism towards attorneys has grown over the last quarter
century. Big businesses and their political allies have cultivated this
attitude by blaming &frivolous lawsuits& and greedy attorneys for
everything from the high cost of health care to a lagging economy.
Business groups, including many of the backers of Proposition 64, even
launched and funded fake grassroots groups named Citizens Against Lawsuit
Abuse starting in 1991 to lend a veneer of public support to their
attorney-bashing. The strategy gained a high-profile messenger in
President George W. Bush, giving anti-lawyer sentiment legitimacy and a
national stage.
The attempt by big business to vilify lawyers and frivolous lawsuits is
unfounded: research reveals that the number of lawsuits filed by
individuals over wrongful acts is actually falling, while lawsuits
brought by businesses against businesses continue to increase. But,
regardless of the veracity of the message, the public is buying it.
Anti-lawyer themes have found increasing resonance across the country.
Yes On 64 successfully used this negative perception of trial lawyers to
give voters an enemy they already disapproved of.
Lesson No. 7: Proposition 64 had a celebrity spokesperson.
Early in the election season, environmental organizations called on
Governor Schwarzenegger to &meet your promise to Californians who care
about the quality of our air and water & and oppose [Proposition 64&s]
direct assault on environmental protection.& Meetings with the governor&s
office led them to understand that he would stay out of the Proposition
64 debate.
The reversal of his position in mid-September shocked environmental
leaders, including the legislative director of Sierra Club California,
who said Schwarzenegger &double-crossed us& when the governor announced
his endorsement of the initiative. The decision was no doubt influenced
by the campaign supporters the governor shared with the Yes on 64
campaign. By Election Day, Schwarzenegger had received $4.8 million from
donors that also gave $4.8 million to Proposition 64, among them Anheuser
Busch, Pfizer, Blue Cross and ChevronTexaco.
Schwarzenegger&s support was highlighted in proponents& television ads,
mailed in the form of a voter guide to 5 million Californians, and added
to a campaign-style bus tour the governor made during the weekend before
the election.
Schwarzenegger carried the day with most of his initiative picks.
Although Proposition 64 was not his most high-profile endorsement, his
popularity in November had not suffered the dive that currently finds him
with approval ratings below 50 percent. Schwarzenegger brought his
celebrity spotlight to shine on Proposition 64&s &frivolous lawsuit&
message, and undoubtedly turned heads toward the Yes campaign&s small
business message.
Not Quite D&j& Vu
Since the passage of insurance reform initiative Proposition 103 in 1988,
California voters have consistently voted no on initiatives that would
secure legal immunity for corporations at the public&s expense. The 1988
voter revolt was inspired by a major loss to insurance companies at the
ballot two years earlier, much like public interest groups& Proposition 64
defeat. Voters asserted their right to fair and reliable auto insurance
rates with Proposition 103 and defeated an $80 million dollar campaign for
a series of anti-consumer counter-measures on the same ballot. Proposition
103&s backers made sure the public knew that the insurance industry was
behind the No campaign and the counter-measures.
A trio of ballot measures meant to limit corporate accountability for
auto accidents, investor scams and dangerous products similarly failed in
1996. Attorneys and lawsuits were maligned in the battle over
Propositions 200, 201, and 202, just as they were last year by proponents
of Proposition 64. But big industry lost in 1996 for the same reasons
they did in 1988: opponents made sure voters knew who the initiative
backers were and what they stood to gain from their attack.
The Proposition 64 victory is certain to embolden big industry in the
initiative arena. Already this year, the pharmaceutical industry
introduced a measure that would have capped attorneys& contingency fees
in California (a law that would effectively close the courtroom door to
any person not wealthy enough to pay a lawyer by the hour). Though the
measure was pulled for political reasons, it is likely to rear its head
again in 2006.
Proponents& actions immediately following the election quickly revealed
that small business had been just a facade for the Yes on 64 campaign,
and disproved their promises that legitimate public interest cases would
not be affected.
Donors to the Proposition 64 campaign, charged in lawsuits filed before
the November election with violating patients& medical privacy, marketing
alcohol to minors and overcharging cellular phone customers, are among
the more than 100 corporate defendants now arguing in court that
Proposition 64 should apply retroactively. If applied retroactively,
Proposition 64 will give the initiative&s big industry backers immunity
for unfair practices in lawsuits that were already in progress when the
measure was approved. Because appeals courts have issued conflicting
decisions, the California Supreme Court will ultimately decide the issue.
As Proposition 64&s final outcome is decided, there is a clear lesson to
be had from the ballot campaign&s success. Big business has honed in on a
strategy that works: Don&t show your face, find a brand-name spokesperson
and exploit mounting anti-lawyer sentiment. Successful counter-campaigns
have exposed big business initiative backers and the rights they are
really after. Reformers who take these lessons to heart may figure out
how to tip the scales in the next battle to protect the public interest.
Balber is a consumer advocate with the
Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights in Santa Monica, California.
She worked on the No on Prop. 64 campaign.