审计独立性风险的成因及对策分析
> 审计独立性风险的成因及对策分析
审计独立性风险的成因及对策分析
来源:毕业论文网
&&&&&&& 应当完善上市公司的治理结构,建立合理的以董事会为中心的公司治理结构,防止经理人员凌驾于董事会之上,禁止董事长兼任总经理,严禁执行董事滥用职权损害公司和中小股东利益的行为.在目前"1股独大"的条件下,可以增设限制上市公司控股股东权力的条款,并考虑采用审计委员会制度.为了使审计委员会能够发挥作用,对审计委员会的独立性应有严格的要求,如必须由什么样的人构成,等等.除此之外,为了确保审计委员会能够有效地开展活动,还应赋予审计委员会1定的权力,其中包括允许企业员工告密. 独立性是注册会计师及其职业存在和发展的条件,独立性风险是指注册会计师存在丧失实质上和形式上独立的可能性.本文将对独立性风险的产生原因、降低独立性风险的对策进行框架分析
&&&&&& 1、审计独立性风险产生的原因&&&&&&& (1)财务利益、非审计服务和诉讼&&&&&&& 1旦注册会计师与客户有了某种财务利益上的牵连,就有可能难以做出客观、公正的判断,这是产生独立性风险的因素之1.财务利益对注册会计师独立性风险的影响通过若干途径产生,即存在直接财务利益、间接财务利益及与财务利益相关的情况.&&& 1.直接财务利益主要是指注册会计师和被审计单位有直接发生的财务利益&&&&&&& 2.间接财务利益是指存在连接注册会计师和被审计单位的第3方,如注册会计师的祖父母拥有客户的股票,而注册会计师又与其祖父母住在1起,则注册会计师与其客户之间构成了间接财务利益关系.当存在直接财务利益时,通常认为注册会计师的独立性受到损害;当存在间接财务利益时,只有该项利益为重大时,注册会计师的独立性才会受到损害&&&&&&& 3.与财务利益相关的情况,主要指:(1)注册会计师曾在客户公司任职.(2)注册会计师或会计师事务所与客户之间存在借贷关系.(3)注册会计师或会计师事务所接受客户的物品与劳务.(4)注册会计师或会计师事务所与客户公司的前任合伙人或股东发生业务联系.(5)注册会计师或会计师事务所的收入严重地依赖于某1客户或某1客户集团.在这种情况下,注册会计师个人利益的多少与该客户或客户集团密切相关,注册会计师就会害怕与客户或客户集团争执;注册会计师会害怕被客户解聘,从而丧失雇佣收入,因而他可能会屈从客户的压力而不会保持其独立性.(6)在审计过程中存在收取和支付佣金的行为.(7)审计过程中存在相机收费的行为.产生独立性风险的因素包括非审计服务、诉讼.如果注册会计师通过非审计服务(如管理咨询)参与了管理当局的经营决策,那么在某种程度上讲,会计师事务所是自己在审计自己,在这种情况下注册会计师还能否保持独立性呢?值得注意的是,美国2002年7月通过的《萨宾纳斯1奥克斯莱法案》对会计师事务所提出了要求:不允许从事非审计业务.此外,如果当审计人员和管理当局由于已经发生的诉讼而形成1种敌对状态时,注册会计师就不能被认为可以客观、公正地对审计事项做出判断&&&&&&& (2)执业环境因素&&&&&&& 产生独立性风险的执业环境因素包括&&&&&&& 1.过多的职业判断.在这里笔者主要关注3种类型的职业判断,这些判断为注册会计师的非独立性行为提供了便利条件.这3种职业判断包括:对异常事项、新生事项会计处理的判断;审计证据的判断;重要性水平的判断.(1)对异常事项、新生事项的会计处理没有已成文的规范.在这些事项面前,若存在有关压力,审计人员就很容易接受被审计单位管理当局的不适当的计处理.(2)审计证据的判断通常指注册会计师要考虑审计证据的数量和质量,从而决定审计证据能否有效地支持审计结论.在存在有关压力的情况下,注册会计师可能不会搜集充分、适当的审计证据.(3)重要性水平的判断要求注册会计师考虑会计报表中错报或漏报达到何种程度会影响报表使用者的判断和决策.在被审计单位的压力下,注册会计师会不适当地认为某1项目并不重要,于是对这1项目就不加以考虑,放弃了要求被审计单位做出相关调整的要求.由于存在这些职业判断,使独立性风险增加了&&&&&&& 2.市场竞争.当审计供给市场的竞争加剧时,客户变更会计师事务所的机会和动力都会增加.如果注册会计师意识到其他会计师事务所争夺该客户,那么注册会计师对客户的独立性会减弱.有研究证明,我国会计师事务所具有数量多、规模小、集中程度低的特点.我国审计市场正处于买方市场环境下,客户管理当局对注册会计师的选择权和决定审计收费的力量尤为强大.另外,我国上市公司在发行股票、股票上市后的1系列运作中都离不开注册会计师的审计报告.无保留意见的审计报告是招股、配股、防止"摘牌"等的必要条件,这会增加上市公司对注册会计师的施压强度.有些地方政府为了地方利益,也会向注册会计师施压,迫使其出具无保留意见的审计报告,提高了审计的独立性风险&&&&&&& 3.被审计单位的公司治理结构.由上市公司股东大会来选聘会计师事务所是受托审计的具体落实.从逻辑上讲,因为股东大会做出的决议代表财产所有者的利益,所以由股东大会决定选聘会计师事务所可以防止上市公司管理层选择特定的会计师事务所从而购买审计意见.为了有效地监督管理者的机会主义行为,防止其损害委托人(即全体股东)的利益,股东大会会谨慎评判董事会提请聘用的会计师事务所是否能坚持足够的独立性,以保证其出具真实、合法的审计报告,切实维护全体股东的利益.然而,这1制度安排在我国上市公司的现行治理结构中失去了作用.由于上市公司股权高度集中于国有独资或控股企业,"1股独大"并且不能上市流通,由此产生了许多缺陷:导致董事会成员主要甚至全部来自作为发起人的国有企业,并且他们大多同时为公司高层管理人员,董事长兼任总经理的现象普遍存在,从而形成了严重的"内部人控制"问题.这样,聘请会计师事务所的权力实际上掌握在上市公司管理层手中,股东大会在聘请会计师事务所的问题上,充其量是个"橡皮图章".参与公司重大决策的董事会或管理者作为代理人,对企业经营负有不可推卸的经济责任,由其聘请会计师事务所来监督自身的行为,则他们可能会要挟会计师事务所出具利己的审计报告从而导致独立性风险增加&&&&&&& 4.会计师事务所的组织形式.会计师事务所的组织形式对独立性风险也有影响.在有限责任制下,投资人以其出资额为限承担审计上的法律责任,且投资人之间无连带责任.显然,投资人违规成本较轻,这也在1定程度上增加了独立性风险
&&&&&&& 2、降低审计独立性风险的对策&&&&&&& (1)监管部门要规范监管&&&&&&& 监管部门的监管常常是通过制定1些法律、法规、准则来规范注册会计师和会计师事务所的行为.如果注册会计师及其会计师事务所不遵守这些规则就会受到处罚.有关的监管部门可以从独立性风险的产生因素、制约因素、独立性风险所造成的社会后果的角度考虑,制定必要的规范进行监管.在上文阐述的引起审计风险的因素中,我国的注册会计师职业规范体系对直接财务利益、间接财务利益、与财务利益相关的情况和非审计服务均有所规范&&&&&&& (2)规范审计收费&&&&&&& 规范审计收费主要是为了防止会计师事务所对客户的过分依赖.我国有关职业规范对收费问题可考虑以下内容:1.注册会计师对1个客户或某1相关联的客户集团的收费若占到其总收入的1定比例,就可能会对独立性产生影响,应加以限制.2.客户有应付而未付给会计师事务所的费用,特别是在经过延期或在下1年度签发审计报告或其他鉴证意见之前仍有重大金额未付,则可能会对注册会计师的独立性造成损害.此外,会计师事务所的规模也是决定注册会计师对客户依赖性的1个重要因素.1方面,会计师事务所拥有的客户越多,那么会计师事务所即使为保持独立性而失去某1客户,对自身的影响也较小;另1方面,会计师事务所规模越大,那么客户影响注册会计师独立性的力量就越弱,因而,我国应鼓励发展大型会计师事务所&&&&&&& (3)强制执行审计师定期轮换制&&&&&&& 1个注册会计师长期给1个公司做审计,会产生1定的密切关系,容易导致造假,而且看不出存在的问题.美国2002年通过的《萨宾纳斯1奥克斯莱法案》明确做出规定:1个审计项目的负责人,主审会计师每5年要换1次.我国可以有所借鉴&&&&&&& (4)完善上市公司治理结构&&&&&&& 应当完善上市公司的治理结构,建立合理的以董事会为中心的公司治理结构,防止经理人员凌驾于董事会之上,禁止董事长兼任总经理,严禁执行董事滥用职权损害公司和中小股东利益的行为.在目前"1股独大"的条件下,可以增设限制上市公司控股股东权力的条款,并考虑采用审计委员会制度.为了使审计委员会能够发挥作用,对审计委员会的独立性应有严格的要求,如必须由什么样的人构成,等等.除此之外,为了确保审计委员会能够有效地开展活动,还应赋予审计委员会1定的权力,其中包括允许企业员工告密.由审计委员会行使委托和批准解聘审计机构、审查审计工作的职权,以减少上市公司管理当局对会计师事务所施加压力,切实增强会计师事务所保持独立的可能性.为了控制被审计单位通过选择会计师事务所来对注册会计师施压,还应加强上市公司对变更会计师事务所的披露,要求上市公司对变更会计师事务所的性质、理由以及与注册会计师存在的分歧等进行详细的说明.通过披露,让投资者意识到上市公司变更会计师事务所的现实,并看到许多背后的问题,进而提高投资者对注册会计师独立性的认识,同时也提高上市公司变更会计师事务所的代价&&&&&&& (5)会计师事务所要健全规章制度&&&&&&& 1.健全复核检查制度.为了保证审计工作的质量,会计师事务所应建立审计工作底稿3级复核制度.所谓审计工作底稿3级复核制度,就是由会计师事务所制定的以主任会计师、部门经理或签字注册会计师和项目经理为复核人的对审计工作底稿进行逐级复核的制度.由于存在这种3级复核制度,对有关审计人员在进行审计时施加了压力,可以迫使审计人员采取降低审计风险的措施.与3级复核制度相类似,同业之间的检查、有关管理部门的检查也能有效地降低独立性风险&&&&&&& 2.健全咨询制度.就审计中遇到的会计难题或其他难题向有关专家进行咨询,弄清关键事项,进而给决策提供必要的条件,增加注册会计师做出正确判断的可能性&&&&&&& 3.健全培训制度.职业培训计划也是降低独立性风险的重要措施,通过职业培训可以增加注册会计师的执业技能,保持知识的更新,有利于降低独立性风险&&&&&&&&(6)加强会计师事务所企业文化和审计人员的职业道德建设&&&&&&& 会计师事务所的企业文化和审计人员的职业道德直接影响着注册会计师的主观能动性.审计人员的职业道德是降低独立性风险的内因,而会计师事务所的企业文化则是降低独立性风险的外因.在审计市场上,对于独立性而言,主要有以下3种类型的企业文化:第1种企业文化强调审计人员对资本提供者(包括股东和债权人)的责任.在这种企业文化背景下,注册会计师应当保护资本提供者的正常利益,减轻资本提供者与资本需求者(资本获得者)之间信息不对称的程度;第2种企业文化强调审计人员是被审计单位(资本需求者)商业运作的合作人.在这种企业文化背景下,强调被审计单位和审计人员的经济利益,从而可能损害资本提供者和其他报表使用者的利益,这种企业文化与公众对注册会计师应发挥作用的期望不1致.在上述两种企业文化之间还存在着另1种企业文化,这种文化强调中立的位置,注册会计师既不站在资本提供者1边,也不站在资本获得者1边.该文化强调如何处理和控制因向资本提供者提供审计报告而产生的风险,从反面强调若注册会计师损害了公众的利益应该承担的法律责任,从而有利于降低独立性风险.
下页更精彩：1
审计独立性风险的成因及对策分析相关推荐文档名称：关于审计独立性探讨.pdf
格式：pdf&&&大小：1.88MB&&&总页数：53
可免费阅读页数：53页
下载源文档需要：20元人民币
请务必先预览看看是否存在文不对题等情况，预览与实际下载的一致，本站不支持退款。第一章　审计独立性
GulTsui1992GulTsui
GulTsui123
GulTsui406762
WindsorAshkanasy1995WindsorAshkanasy123
WindsorAshkanasy61717WindsorAshkanasy34WindsorAshkanasy123
Beattie, BrandtFearnley<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0mso-fareast-font-family:楷体_GBBeattie, BrandtFearnleyH1a:(ECDEP)(COMP)(NAS)(FLEX)(AUDSIZE)(AC)(FININT)(PAI)H1b:(DIRCON)(CLIENT)(PAI)H1c:(AUDCH)(AUDCHREG)(AUDREG)(AGM)(PAI)H2: H3:
Beattie, BrandtFearnley(FDs)300153(APs)1995Accountancy Age20307244(FJs)5018512345
&&& Beattie, BrandtFearnley123
EmbyDavidson1998EmbyDavidsonEmbyDavidson12345
EmbyDavidson14092$100,100$294000$489000115100100EmbyDavidson1234
二、非审计服务对审计独立性的影响
Schults<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0mso-fareast-font-family:楷体_GBSchultsSchults<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0mso-fareast-font-family:楷体_GB<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0mso-fareast-font-family:楷体_GB<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0mso-fareast-font-family:楷体_GB<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0mso-fareast-font-family:楷体_GB<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0mso-fareast-font-family:楷体_GB<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0mso-fareast-font-family:楷体_GB<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0mso-fareast-font-family:楷体_GB<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0mso-fareast-font-family:楷体_GB
Schults6Schults
ScheinerKiger1982ScheinerKigerWho Audits AmericanBig 8500Big 8100600 17408408ScheinerKiger7110-24.99%25-49.99%3-9.9%
PanyReekers (1983)SECSECSECSECPanyReekers
PanyReekersPanyReekers10%40%10%40%PanyReekers18187
PanyReekers60092PanyReekers
ParkashVenable1993ParkashVenableParkashVenable1
1Nonaudit ServicesRECURNON RECURRECURNON RECUR MGRONROUTCONLVRGMGRONROUTCONLVRGAUDITORArthur Andersen10YEAR1979YEAR198019791980INDSPC10NETINCe
ParkashVenableFortune 50019781980860-197825719792911980312ParkashVenable
Craswell (1999),Craswell11Opinion1LATCATADEROILoss1Big10RNAS
Opinion=b0+b1LAT+b2Sub+b3CATA+b4DE+b5ROI+b6Loss+b7Big+b8RNAS&&& (1)
Craswell1984199419848851987147719941079Craswell
Firth2002FirthFirth12
11LAFLCFMA10NI10AIS10CEOCEO10RES10LTADTAROCELSUBSCURQRLOSS010B610YE1210QUAL10
LAF=&0+&1LCF+&2MA+&3NI+&4AIS+&5CEO+&6RES+&7MALCF+&8NILCF+&9AISLCF+&10CEOLCF+&11RESLCF+&12LTA+&13DTA+&14ROCE+&15LSUBS+&16CUR+&17QR+&18LOSS+&19B6+&20YE+&21QUAL&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& (1)
22CF/TAINTAARTAAGE10BETAAC/INC
QUAL=&0+&1CF/TA+&2LTA+&3LOSS+&4SR+&5DTA+&6INTA+&7B6+&8ARTA+&9AGE+&10BETA+&11VAR+&12AC/INC+&13AF/TA&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& (2)
Firth1112Firth
Quick＆Warming-Rasmussen (2005)12345
QuickWarming-Rasmussen5927420012767848115“”1234535441234545“”12345
QuickWarming-Rasmussen4
Asare, CohenTrompeter (2005)Asare, CohenTrompeter123a:3b:4
Big57349999Asare, CohenTrompeter13b4
Asare, CohenTrompeter
50%25%Bugeja2005Bugeja12Bugeja21
1ARExpInd10Opinion10DirRec10Mining10Payt10Multiple10 MBSizeSegment PageBugejaAustralian Financial Review19902000694Bugeja1Bugeja
三、道德及文化因素对审计独立性的因素
Tsui1996TsuiTsuiRest<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0mso-fareast-font-family:楷体_GBTsuiTsuiTsui1TsuiHofstede<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0mso-fareast-font-family:楷体_GBHofstede8TsuiTsui2
TsuiTsuiCFO50127Tsui111YX1X2X32TsuiTsui2
Tsui1996locus of controlTsuiTsui1
Tsui804Big 65Big 6Rotter(1966)Rest(1979)TsuiCFO
Tsui11YX1X2X1&X2Tsui
SweeneyRoberts1997Kohlberg, 1969; Rest, 1979
SweeneyRoberts1234
SweeneyRobertsRest1979CFO1000
8600312SweeneyRoberts124
Falk et al (1999)Falk et al
Falk et al123Falk et al
Falk et alFalk et al
PatelPsaros (2000)“”
60946678PatelPsaros5%25%MAS MAS 988329PatelPsaros
四、客户雇佣对审计独立性的因素
Imhoff<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0mso-fareast-font-family:楷体_GB
Imhoff2Big 82619<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0mso-fareast-font-family:楷体_GB%<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0mso-fareast-font-family:楷体_GB%<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0mso-fareast-font-family:楷体_GB%<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0mso-fareast-font-family:楷体_GB%<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0mso-fareast-font-family:楷体_GB%ImhoffImhoffCPACPA<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0mso-fareast-font-family:楷体_GB57<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0mso-fareast-font-family:楷体_GB87Imhoff10
ChyekonMahathevan (1993)ChyekonMahathevanChyekonMahathevan41234
ChyekonMahathevan3922471472411
&&& ChyekonMahathevan1234
五、其他因素对审计独立性的因素
PanyReckers<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0mso-fareast-font-family:楷体_GBPanyReckers$3, $40, $125(1%10%)PanyReckers127
表12　客户规模、礼品和购买折扣的组合
客户规模（从客户获得的收入
占全部收入收入的比例）
客户提供的礼品和购买折扣
购买折扣安排
小客户（占收入的1%）
大客户（占收入的10%）
PanyReckers<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0mso-fareast-font-family:楷体_GB<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0mso-fareast-font-family:楷体_GBPanyReckers
LeeGu<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0mso-fareast-font-family:楷体_GBlow ballingLeeGucollusionLeeGulow balling
LeeGulow ballinglow ballinglow ballinglow ballinglow balling
LeeGuinfinite-horizon model,LeeGu(local )U(S,A)=S&A SAA ∈(Ah ,A0)Ah &A0LeeGulow ballingSECCohenlow ballingLeeGulow ballinglow ballingLeeGulow ballingLow ballingLow ballingflat-fee
Noel o’sullivan (2000)Noel osullivanNoel osullivan402
19971998Yang et al (2001)Yang et alYang et al119961997219971998
Yang et alYang et alYang et al
Craswell, StokesLaughton (2002)Craswell, StokesLaughtonCraswell, StokesLaughtonCraswell, StokesLaughton1
1OPINION10FEEFIRMFEELOCFEELnTASUBCA/TALeverageROILOSS2BIGBig 610OPINIONt-110IND10te
Craswell, StokesLaughton1994199621071994106219961045Craswell, StokesLaughton
第二节　审计独立性的其他问题
一、审计师抵制客户管理者压力的能力
NicholsPrice1976NicholsPrice123NicholsPriceG&BGoldman, Barlev, 19741341
NicholsPriceG&BNicholsPriceG&BNicholsPrice3NicholsPrice123
&&& CPACPACPA
Knapp1985KnappKnapp
Knapp437884214Knapp12
Knapp1987KnappKnapp12Big 8Big 834
KnappCalifornia 50018118136217987928784215Knapp134
Gul1991GulMASGul12MASMAS34
Gul72491671616
RuyterWetzels1999Morgan & Hunt<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0mso-fareast-font-family:楷体_GBawarenessexplorationexpansioncommitmentdissolutioncalculative commitmentaffective commitmentRuyterWetzelsRuyterWetzels
RuyterWetzels6RuyterWetzelsantecedents of commitment9123456789
consequences of commitmentRuyterWetzels6101112131415
111RuyterWetzels7RuyterWetzels<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0mso-fareast-font-family:楷体_GB<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0mso-fareast-font-family:楷体_GBRuyterWetzels24561011121415
二、不同主体对审计独立性的判定
Lavin1976LavinSECAICPALavinSECAICPALavinH01AICPAH02H03
Lavin330181365AICPA876390AICPA202114741212Accounting Series Release No.126H01 H02 H03LavinSECAICPASECAICPAAICPA
GoldmanBarlev<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0mso-fareast-font-family:楷体_GBGoldmanBarlev123GoldmanBarlevGoldmanBarlev174GoldmanBarlevGoldmanBarlev123
Firth<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0mso-fareast-font-family:楷体_GBFirth<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0mso-fareast-font-family:楷体_GB<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0mso-fareast-font-family:楷体_GB
FirthBig 82929ICAEW, ICAS, SEC9199159
DykxhoornSinning(1982)Lavin (1977) and Lavin & Libby (1977)DykxhoornSinningnull hypothesesH01(DL) H02DIH0&1=&2H1&1≠&2&1&2
&DykxhoornSinning1104427EDP27515DykxhoornSinningDLDIDLDI
HakaChalos (1990)HakaChalosHakaChalosHakaChalos123A3B45
HakaChalos<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0mso-fareast-font-family:楷体_GBFortune 500CEO<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0mso-fareast-font-family:楷体_GB<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0mso-fareast-font-family:楷体_GB<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size:12.0mso-fareast-font-family:楷体_GB57CEO5355HakaChalos
Blackwell, NolandWinters1998Blackwell, NolandWinters11(Interest Rate-Prime Rate)Ln(Total Assets);Ln(Years as Customer of the Bank); Total Debt/Total Assets Dummy for Higher-Risk Loans10;Collateral Dummy10;Audit Dummy10
Blackwell, NolandWinters1988212Blackwell, NolandWinters37%16%24%23%Blackwell, NolandWinters
WirtschaftspruferSECSECSECDykxhoornSinning1981SECDykxhoornSinningSEC
DykxhoornSinning38010SEC10EDP
DykxhoornSinningSECSEC
Wright1983WrightWright55WrightMcAllisterWinslow2418712317
GoodwinYeo (2001)GoodwinYeoGoodwinYeoGoodwinYeo8065GoodwinYeo
11-22-33-4
GoodwinYeo
Asare, S., Cohen, J., Trompeter, G. The effect of non-audit services on client risk, acceptance and staffing decisions. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 24 (2005), 489–520
Bugeja, M. The ‘Independence’of Expert Opinions in Corporate Takeovers: Agreeing With Directors’ Recommendations. Journal of Business Finance&Accounting, 32(9)&(10),November/December -686X
Blackwell,D.W.,Noland,T.R., and Winters, D.B. The value of auditor assurance: Evidence from loan pricing. Journal of Acounting Research, Vol.36 No. 1 Spring 1998
Beattie,V., Brandt,R., Fearnley, S. Perceptions of Auditor Independence:U.K., Evidence Journal of International Accounting, Auditing & Taxation, 8(1),7
&&& Craswell, A.T. Does the provision of non-audit services impair auditor independence. Int. J. Audit.3:29-40(1999).
Chyekon,H., Mahathevan, P. The Effects Of Client Employment On Auditor Independence. British Accounting Review(-242.
Craswell, A., Stokes, D.J., Laughton, J. Auditor independence and fee dependence. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33 (5.
Dykxhoorn,H.J., Sinning, K.E. Wirtschaftsprufer perception of auditor independence. The Accounting Review, Vol.56, No.1 (Jan.,.
Dykxhoorn,H.J., Sinning, K.E.& Perceptions of auditor independence: its perceived effect on the loan and investment decisions of German financial statement users. Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 7, No. 4,(1982) pp. 337-347
Emby,C., Davidson.R.A. The Effects of Engagement Factors on Auditor Independence: Canadian Evidence. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing & Taxation, 7(2): 163-179, 1998.
& &Firth, M. Perceptions of Auditor Independence and Official Ethical Guidelines. The Accounting Review, Vol.55, No.3 (Jul., 1980), 451-466.
Firth, M. A., Qualified Audit Reports: Their Impact on Investment Decisions, The Accounting Review (July, 1978), pp. 642-650.
Firth, M. A., Perceptions of Auditor Independence and Official EthicaI Guidelines, The Accounting Review (July, 19801, pp. 451-466.
Firth, M. Auditor-provided consultancy services and their associations with audit fees and audit opinion. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 29(5)&(6), June/July -686X
Falk, H., Lynn, B., Mestelman, S., Shehata, M. Auditor independence, self-interested behavior and ethics: some experimental Evidence. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 18 (8.
Goldman, A., Barlev, B. The auditor-firm conflict of interests: its implications for independence. The Accounting Review (Oct., 1974), pp. 707-718.
Goodwin,J., Yeo, T.Y.& Tow factors affecting internal audit independence and objectivity: Evidence from Singapore. Int. J. Audit.5:107-125(2001).
Gul,F.A.& Size of Audit Fees and Perceptions of Auditors’Ability to Resist Management Pressure in Audit Conflict Situations, ABACUS, Vol. 27, No. 2, 162-172,1991.
Gul, F.A. Bankers perceptions of factors affecting auditor independence. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 23, 40-51, 1989.
Gul, F.A., Tsui, J.S.K. An Empirical Analysis of Hong Kong Bankers' Perceptions of Auditor Ability to Resist Management Pressure in an Audit Conflict Situation. Journal of International Accounting Auditing & Taxation, 1(2):177-190, 1992.
Hofstede, G.H. 1991. Cultures and Organizations: software of the mind. London: McGraw-Hill.
Haka, S., Chalos, P. Evidence of Agency Conflict Among Management, Auditors, and the Audit Committee Chair. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 9, 271-292 (1990).
Imhoff, E.A. Employment effects on auditor independence. The Accounting Review, Vol. 53, No. 4 (Oct., 1978), 869-881.
Kohlberg, L. (1969). Stage and sequence: the cognitive developmental approach to socialization. In D. A.Goslin (Ed.), Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research (pp. 347-480). Chicago: Rand McNally.
Knapp, M.C. Audit conflict: and empirical study of the perceived ability of auditors to resist management pressure. The Accounting Review, Vol. 60, No. 2 (Apr., 1985), 202-211.
Knapp, M.C. An empirical study of audit committee support for auditors involved in technical disputes with client management. The Accounting Review, Vol. 62, No. 3 (Jul., 1987), 578-588.
Lavin, D., Some Effects of the Perceived Independence of the Auditor, Accounting, Organizations and Society (Vol. 2, No. 3, 1977), pp. 237-244.
Laving, D. & Libby, R., The Effect of the Perceived Independence of the Auditor on the Loan Deci-sion, Journal of Bank Research (Summer, 1977), pp. 118-121.
Lavin, D. Perceptions of the independence of the auditor, The Accounting Review, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Jan., 1976) , 41-50.
Lee,C-W,J., Gu, Z.,Y.& Low Balling, Legal Liability and Auditor Independence. The Accounting Review, Vol.73, No.4 (Oct., 1998), 533-555.
Morgan, R.M., Hunt, S.D. 1994. The commitment-trust theory of relationships marketing. Journal of Marketing, 58, 20-38.
Noel o’sullivanThe impact of board composition and ownership on audit quality: Evidence from large UK companies, British Accounting Review (7–414
Nichols,D.R., Price,K.H.. The Auditor-Firm Conflict: An Analysis Using Concepts of Exchange Theory. The Accounting Review, Vol.51, No. 2(Apr., 5
Pany, K., Reekers, P. M.J. Auditor Independence and Nonaudit Services: Director Views and Their Policy Implications. Journal of Accounting t& and Public Policy, 2.43-62 (1983).
Parkash, M., Venable, C.F. Auditee incentives for auditor independence: the case of nonaudit services. The Accounting Review, Vol. 68, No. 1 (Jan., 1993), 113-133.
Patel,C., Psaros, J. &Perceptions of external auditors’ independence: some cross-cultural evidence. British Accounting Review (1–338.
Pany,K., Reckers, P.M.J. The effect of gifts, discounts, and client size on perceived auditor independence, The Accounting Review, Vol.55, No.2(Jan.,.
Quick, R., Warming-Rasmussen,B. The impact of MAS on perceived auditor independence-some evidence from Denmark. Accounting Forum ,29 (2005), 137–168.
Ruyter, K.D., Wetzels, M. Commitment in auditor-client relationships: antecedents and consequences. Accounting, Organization and Society 24 1999 57-75.
Rest, J. R., Development in judging Moral Issues (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1979.
Rotter, J. B., Generalized Expectancies for Internal Versus External Control of Reinforcement, Psychological Monograpbs (1966) p. 609.
Sweeney,J.T., Roberts, R.W. Cognitive moral development and auditor independence. Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 22. No. 3/4, pp 337-352, 1997
Schults, A.A. Compatibility of management consulting and auditing. The Accounting Review, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Jul., 1965), 587-593.
Scheiner, J.H., Kiger, J.E. An empirical investigation of auditor involvement in non-audit services. Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Autumn, 1982), pp. 482-496.
Tsui, J.S.L. Auditors’ Ethical Reasoning: Some Audit Conflict and Cross Cultural Evidence. The International Journal of Accounting, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 121-133, 1996.
Tsui, J.S.L., Gul, F.A. Auditors behaviour in an audit conflict situation: a research note in the role of locus of control and ethical reasoning. Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 21, No. 1. PP. 41-51, 1996.
&&& Wright, A. The impact of CPA-Firm size on auditor disclosure preferences. The Accounting Review, Vol.58, No.3(Jul.,2.
Windsor,C.A., Ashkanasy, N.M. The Effect of Client Management Bargaining Power, Moral Reasoning Development, And Belief in A Just World on Auditor Independence. Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 20, No. 7/S, pp. 701-720, 1995.
Yang, L., Tang, Q., Kilgore, A., Jiang, Y.H. Auditor-government associations and auditor independence in China. British Accounting Review (5–189.