你会爱上机器人吗？先看脸？聪明且不任性也许更重要
人工智能会不会让我们变得越变越懒？
机器人帮你做家务真能带给你“坐享其成”的体验么？
这可不好说。
前提是，这个家伙需要“聪明”且“不任性”。
当科幻作品早就在探讨人和机器人之间会不会产生真感情的时候，很多人却对他们家的“机器人”却怎么也爱不起来，比如，现在不少家庭已经拥有的扫地机器人。
（嗯……Some Robots……）
图片来源：giphy.com
“经历过机器人的‘边刷’把散落的猫粮狂放地拨向远处……明明想靠它偷懒，结果它扫着，
我还得跟在后面‘擦屁股’！”
“好奇地用面粉铺在地上试了一下，眼睁睁地看着它像扫出了一个尘土飞扬的气势。”
“线路没规划，超级忙碌地到处蹿，但仔细看看发现，扫过的地方会重复扫，没扫的地方，反而还真没扫到，简直逼出强迫症！”
“设置了自动清洁，想着回家也就扫好了。结果一进门，看到它卡在客厅和卫生间的隔断上。”
图片来源：giphy.com
以至于有一种无奈，叫做“与其花钱买一款不靠谱的扫地机器人，居然还不如鼓起勇气自己扫地更省心！”
看来想要避免徒增烦恼，就需要对产品的清洁能力、智能导航能力和越障能力三个方面进行考察。有没有一款产品能够配备以上所有技能呢？我们来测一下（戳视频强势围观
视频里出现的Dyson 360 Eye(TM)的中文名叫戴森智能吸尘机器人。不禁让人好奇，那个拥有强劲马达驱动的吸尘器，真的被搬进这个小巧的机身里了吗？
没开玩笑，“机器人”里还真有“吸尘器”
清洁能力是这类自动清洁地面机器人最“本分”的职责，然而却也是吐槽的重灾区。
不少机器人的扫地模式并不能有效地清洁灰尘等细小杂物，而“边刷+滚刷”的组合，有时也会出现把灰尘推开，或者将毛发等杂物缠在边刷上的情况，并未能把灰尘收集起来。
看来，灰尘过敏原的最大克星可能还得是大吸力的吸尘器。
图片来源：giphy.com
视频里测试的这款吸尘机器人使用了小巧强劲的数码马达，能提供22AW(Air Watts)的吸力，比普通扫地机器人的平均进气量高出10倍左右，还能根据负载大小调整吸力，有效深层吸除各种尘杂过敏原。
测试的时候，特别在地板和地毯上都选择了粉末进行测试。毕竟要在地毯上将粉末这种细小的尘杂吸除干净，对产品的吸力和吸附工具的综合能力可是一个不小的考验。
（地板地毯都搞定，有GIF有真相）
戴森这款吸尘机器人拥有与机身等宽的刷头，并使用了专利防静电碳纤维刷条技术，其配备了碳纤维和硬质尼龙两种刷毛，结合强劲的吸力，不仅可以清除硬质地板上的微尘，还可以搅动地毯纤维，并深入其中将尘垢卷出。
仔细看机身经过之处和未经过处的对比，哪怕是清洁地毯，感觉都可以不用操心跟着进行“二次清洁”啦。
同样的，在这款吸尘机器人身上也使用了专利多圆锥气旋集尘技术，通过对尘埃的高速离心旋转处理，将尘垢从空气中高效分离，使进风口不堵塞，从而保持了产品持续的强集尘力，也不需要额外更换滤网和尘袋。
如果我们的机器人气流量大，吸入的尘埃多，那排气量是不是也大呢？会不会很多尘垢、过敏原在机身里只是走了过场，一头进一头出呢？
放心，戴森的吸尘机器人和品牌的吸尘器一样，配备了整机HEPA过滤系统。室内的灰尘和过敏原在被机器人吸入后，被气旋分离并被良好的密闭性的HEPA系统拦截于尘桶中。
所以，除了大吸力之外，能有效锁住过敏原，排出洁净空气，才是真正意义上实现了“扫干净”这件事。
可以说，戴森把一直以来使用于核心产品吸尘器上的专利技术都巧妙地武装进这款产品中，所到之处灰尘和过敏原都几乎“片甲不留”。
区别于大多数靠扫来清洁的机器人，戴森这款产品是市面上首款真正意义上的吸尘器机器人，说它是一个“自动行走的戴森吸尘器人”，简直是再贴切不过啦。
“看得见”的路径规划能力，不乱窜还更高效
其实 “漏扫”、“重复扫”、“乱扫”、“效率低”，在某种程度上，都算机器人不够“聪明”的体现。
试想如果让你把眼睛蒙上进行盲扫，这样的情况是不是就情有可原了？
所以，换个思路来解题，何不让机器人真正“看得见”？
戴森吸尘机器人使用了360度全景视觉技术，对比一些不设视觉系统，或只能识别几十度的普通机器人镜头，这一独特的视觉系统能实实在在地看见房间360°的全景，并在45°内，以30张/秒的速率抓拍图片进行记录。
那么第二个问题来了，看得见就一定扫得好吗？
要想有规律且有效率地前进，先要能自己绘制一个系统的路线图。这里就需要提到SLAM（Simultaneous Localization and Mapping）技术，是指移动机器人在未知环境中进行探索时，利用自身装载的传感器获取的观测数据，实时建立与环境一致的地图，同时利用已经建立的地图模型对机器人进行定位的技术。
戴森的这款吸尘机器人就是运用了SLAM技术，实时在环境中进行三角定位，确保可以清洁房间中各个可到达的角落，不用担心大面积漏扫的情况出现啦！
此外，如之前提到，这台机器人还拥有与机身等宽的刷头。这样一来，但凡它走过的地方，都会被清扫到，不仅清洁覆盖面积更全面，不走弯路错路的它，和随机碰撞式行走的机器人比起来，效率也是杠杠滴。
勇往直前又机智体贴，靠谱清扫不添堵
既然能系统有效地清理房间的各个角落，那房间里的不可避免的一些小门槛，斜坡会不会阻挡它的脚步？
翻！再翻！看这种特写镜头，有种越野的霸气和快感
这款机器人使用了一体式坦克履带的行走模块，履带的不间断波纹设计，增大了其与地面的附着力，使行走路线更加稳定；两条履带都有各自独立马达驱动，在必要的障碍前，能够提供足够动力，作为主人的你，也就不用操着“时刻准备提供救援”的心啦。
越障没问题，那避障呢？
如果脑洞大开增加一点难度——
在清洁过程中遇到突然出现的障碍物，机器人是否也能时刻做好准备？
为了避免DUANG DUANG碰撞家具这种“蠢萌”情况的出现，这个机智的小家伙也是配备了多个距离感测器的。
在挑战实时避障的方面，我们也淘气了一把，同时启动了紫红和蓝色的两款吸尘机器人，效果怎么样？
滑动，旋转，竟然觉得有点浪漫~
虽然实时避障的功能实际情况上用得不多，但是在实际家居清洁中，能做到在行进过程中实时感测障碍物，实在让人觉得有点贴心。
如果想要真正地做到解放双手，找一个靠谱的地面清洁帮手，戴森这款智能吸尘机器人可能提供了一种更优质的用户体验——更干净、更智能、更高效，而且也能帮助锁住那些看不见的灰尘过敏原。
此外，它还配备了APP，不仅可以每天设置清扫的时间，自动出征吸除你房间地板上的污渍和过敏原，还可以在任务完成后看到具体清洁路径，验收它的工作成果，完全享受着“躺着也把地给扫干净”的感觉！
你看，撒了一地的狗粮，它也能穿梭自如帮你捡（围笑
人和机器人会产生感情吗？
不一定。不过……
果壳实验室的小伙伴也表示，对测试后就快速回收机子这件事很心痛，而且某位不愿透露任何身份信息特征的小伙伴表示，虽然也曾测试过不少产品，但已对这款智能黑科技吸尘机器人念念不忘……
把这款全新的戴森新生代智能机器人抱回家~
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& 和机器人恋爱、性爱是什么样的？那感觉...
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和机器人恋爱、性爱是什么样的？那感觉...
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用合作网站帐户直接登录人工智能和性 你愿意与机器人做爱吗？
如果说斯派克·琼斯的《她Her》致力于反思人类，人工智能，和爱之间的关系，那么亚力克斯·嘉兰2015年最新力作《机器姬》就用一个男人和女机器人的故事摸索着人工智能和性之间的界限。“人工智能与性是否真的能结合”这个处于道德灰色地带的问题再一次横亘在我们眼前
　　一个完全了解你的机器人，知道你的所有需求，能预测你会有的每一个举动，你会愿意和它发生什么关系吗？
　　如果说斯派克&琼斯的《她Her》致力于反思人类，人工智能，和爱之间的关系，那么亚力克斯&嘉兰2015年最新力作《机器姬》就用一个男人和女机器人的故事摸索着人工智能和性之间的界限。&人工智能与性是否真的能结合&这个处于道德灰色地带的问题再一次横亘在我们眼前，质疑着我们的选择。当机器人变得足够聪明，与人类足够相似，性机器人的问题一定会不可避免的出现，在这样的关系里，我们，机器人，各自都会处于什么样的角色？
（《机器姬》剧照）
　　这个问题也一直拷问着研究者们。最近，性学专家Ian Kerner博士提出，既然把人作为治疗工具是违法的，那么是不是可以用机器人治疗性难题和创伤呢？这个想法或许可以帮助一些有性问题或没有性经验的人放松并学习适当的性技巧。
　　可是其他的学者指出，将机器人作为治疗工具，可能引发的问题远远多过它可以解决的问题。
（日本创造的少女机器人Kodomoroid）
　　曼彻斯顿大学毕业生Gareth Price说：&如果真的有这么一代人，伴随着能了解他们每一个需求的性玩具长大，很难想象他们应该怎么与真实的人类相处。&
　　去年就有机器人顶尖专家表达过自己的顾虑：照这个势头发展下去，模拟小孩样貌的性机器人一定会不可避免被制造出来。
（图为法国艺术家C&sar Vonc描绘的未来性机器人，可以看见它奇异的机器人内脏）
　　制造他们的初衷是好的，是为了治疗恋童癖者，拯救更多的孩子。可是随之而来的一系列问题，例如这样的性体验会不会让人上瘾？如果机器人能提供完美的性，安全感和爱，那么人和人之间真实的，充满破洞和瑕疵的感情是否还有存在的必要？这一系列问题都值得我们反思。
您可能感兴趣的文章【AEON】机器人的爱，你会接受吗？
我们的恋人似乎爱着我们，似乎是自由地选择了我们。但倘若机器人能模仿他们的行为，那么我们能否继续有力地否定机器感情的真实性呢？
机器人的爱，你会接受吗？
译者：李林治 & 张嫣
校对：徐唱
编辑：尹子梦
Embracing the robot
与机器人谈场恋爱吧
本文选自 AEON| 取经号原创翻译
Robot relationships need not be kinky, exploitative or fake. In fact they might give human relationships a helpful boost
机器人的感情不应是变态的、受人利用的、或是虚假的。事实上，与机器人的感情可能会有效地助益人际关系。
There is a heartbreaking scene in the middle of Blade Runner ). The hero of the movie, a replicant called K, lives a drab existence in a dystopian, future Los Angeles. The one bright spot in his life is his patient and sympathetic partner, Joi. They share many affectionatemoments on screen. But then she is killed, in the midst of declaring her love, in one of the movie’s most gut-wrenching moments. I know I shed a tear when I first saw it.
电影《银翼杀手2049》有一幕令人心碎。男主角复制人K独自乏味地生活在未来的洛杉矶，一个反乌托邦世界里。他生命中唯一的亮光是耐心且富有同情心的伙伴乔希。银幕上，他们有着许多深情款款的镜头。但紧随其后的便是乔希的“死亡”——她死在吐露爱意的中途，死在电影最令人撕心裂肺的瞬间。当我初次观影，我也不禁落泪。
affectionate/?'fek??n?t/adj. showing in a gentleway that you love someone and care about them充满深情的
There is, however, something unusual about Joi. She is a mass-produced, artificially intelligent hologram, designed to be the perfect partner. She learns from her interactions with K, and shifts her personality to suit his moods. Her ‘death’, such as it is, is due to the fact that she can exist only in the presence of a particular holographic emanator. When it is destroyed, so is she.
但是，乔希并不普通。她是批量出产的人工智能全息像，出生便被设计为最佳的伴侣。她从与K的互动中学习，并转换自己的性格来迎合K的情绪。她所谓的“死亡”是因为她只能依靠特定的全息投影设备而存在。当设备被破坏，那便是就是她的消失之时。
Joi would be little more than a science-fiction curioif it were not for the fact that real-world companies are trying to create versions of her. The Japanese company Gatebox, for instance, sells Azuma Hikari. ‘She’ is a holographic AI, projected inside a cylindrical tube, who is intended to be an intimate companion. In an advertisement, we see her waking up her (male) user in affectionate tones and greeting him when he comes home at the end of the day. She provides a simulacrumof married life for the growing population of single Japanese men. And it’s not just emotional support that is on the cards – sex is, too. Although this is not a feature of Azuma Hikari, other companies are eagerly racing to create robotic lovers and sexual partners.
倘若现实世界的公司没有费尽心机地创造如乔希一般的机器人，那么她也不过就是科幻电影中的一件瑰宝。日本公司Gatebox贩售了Azuma Hikari——意在成为人类亲密伴侣、投影在圆柱管中的人工智能全息像。广告中，她在清晨用亲昵的语调唤醒男主人，在主人下班回家时向他问好。她为越来越多的日本单身男性提供模拟的婚后生活。而且，不仅仅是情感支持，性服务也成为可能。尽管Azuma Hikari没有这样的功能，但其他公司正争先恐后地开发机器爱人及其他机器性伴侣。
Is this a welcome development? A number of critics have voiced their concerns. They claim that relationships with robots would be fake and illusory: perceptual tricks, foisted on us by commercially driven corporations. They are also concerned about how these robotic partners will represent real people, particularly women, and the consequences that their use will have for society.
这是一种受欢迎的发展趋势吗？一部分批评家已经对此表示担忧。他们表示，人机恋是虚假的，是一种幻想。它是认知上的错觉，只是商业公司的营销手段罢了。他们担心这些机器人伴侣未来会替代真人，尤其是女性，也对人们使用机器人伴侣后产生的社会影响忧心忡忡。
Contrary to the critics, I believe our popular discourse about robotic relationships has become too dark and dystopian. We overstate the negatives and overlook the ways in which relationships with robots could complement and enhance existing human relationships.
与这些批评相反，我相信大众对人机恋的看法还是过于黑暗且反面了。我们过分夸大人机恋的缺点，却忽视了人机恋也能够弥补甚至增进现存的人际关系。
Philosophers emphasise the need for mutual commitment in any meaningful relationship. It’s not enough for you to feel a strong, emotional a they have to feel a similar attachment to you. Robots might be able to perform love, saying and doing all the right things, but performance is insufficient. Furthermore, even if the robot was capable of some genuine mutual commitment, it would have to give this commitment freely. Robots will no they will be programmed to love you, in order to serve the commercial interests of their corporate overlords.
哲学家们强调，若想恋爱关系有意义，相互承诺是必需的。仅仅是一方感受到与另一方的强烈的牵绊是不够的，另一方也必须能感受到同样的牵绊。机器人也许能表现出爱，能说好做好所有的事情，但只有表现是不够的。此外，即便机器人能做出一些真诚的承诺，这些承诺也必须是基于自由的意志。机器人不会自发地选择爱你，只是程序使然。而这也仅是为了满足公司巨头们的商业胃口。
This looks like a powerful set of objections to the possibility of robot-human love. But not all these objections are as persuasive as they first appear. After all, what convinces us that our fellow human beings satisfy the mutuality and free-choice conditions outlined above? It’s hard to see what the answer could be other than the fact that they go through certain behavioural motions that are suggestive of this: they act ‘as if’ they love us and ‘as if’ they have freely chosen us as their partners. If robots can mimic these behavioural motions, it’s not clear that we would have any ground for denying the genuineness of their affection. The philosopher Michael Hauskeller made this point rather well in Mythologies of Transhumanism (2016):
看起来，这些都是反对人机恋强有力的证据。但是，并非所有的证据都如表面所显示的那样具有说服力。归根到底，是什么让我们深信人类在恋爱中满足了上述的相互性和自由性呢？除了参照特定的行为，我们很难回答这个问题：他们“似乎”爱着我们，“好像”是自由地选择了我们。但倘若机器人能模仿这些行为，那么，我们能否继续有力地否定机器感情的真实性呢？这将不得而知。哲学家Michael Hauskeller在Mythologies of Transhumanism（2016）一书很好地论述了这一观点：
It is difficult to see what this love … should consist in, if not a certain kind of loving behaviour… if our lover’s behaviour toward us is unfailingly caring and loving, and respectful of our needs, then we would not really know what to make of the claim that they do not really love us at all, but only appear to do so.
如果没有某种爱的表现方式，我们便很难感知爱的存在……如果我们的另一半始终如一地关切、爱护并尊重我们的需求，那么我们便无法得知他们是否其实根本不爱我们，只是表现得如此而已。
The same goes for concerns about free choice. It is, of course, notoriouslycontroversial whether or not humans have free choice, and not just
but if we need to believe that our lovers freely choose their ongoing commitment to us, then it is hard to know what could ground that belief other than certain behavioural indicators that are suggestive of this, eg their apparent willingness to break the commitment when we upset or disappoint them. There is no reason why such behavioural mimicry needs to be out of bounds for robots. Elsewhere, I have defended this view of human-robot relations under the label ‘ethical behaviourism’, which is a position that holds that the ultimate epistemic grounding for our beliefs about the value of relationships lies in the detectable behavioural and functional patterns of our partners, not in some deeper metaphysical truths about their existence.
这样的担忧同时适用于自由选择。当然，人类的自由选择是否只是错觉还饱受争议。但如果要相信我们的爱人是基于自由意志自然而然地爱上我们，那除了某些能给出暗示的特定行为（如我们沮丧或对其失望时，他们明确地想要毁坏承诺），我们再无根据。同理，我们也没有理由来怀疑模仿这些行为是超出机器人能力范围的。此外，从“道德行为主义”这一点来看，我也坚决捍卫人机恋。“道德行为主义”者认为：人际关系的价值是基于另一半可观察的行为及功能模式，而非基于在关于他们存在性的一些更深层的形而上真理。
notorious /n??'t?:ri?s/ adj. famousor well known for something bad 臭名昭著的
Ethical behaviourism is a bitter pill for some. Even though he expresses the view well, Hauskeller, to take just one example, ultimately disagrees with it when it comes to human-robot relationships. He argues that the reason why behavioural patterns are enough to convince us that our human partners are in love with us is because we have no reason to doubt the sincerity of those behaviours. The problem with robots is that we do have such reasons:
道德行为主义对一些人来便是一种困扰了。例如Hauskeller，即便他很好地表述了上述想法，但他最终仍反对人机恋。他认为，行为模式之所以能让我们相信，我们的另一半确实与我们坠入爱河，是因为我们没有理由怀疑人类行为是否真诚。但是，机器人的问题在于，我们确实有充分理由去质疑它们的真实性：
As long as we have an alternative explanation for why the robot behaves that way (namely, that it has been designed and programmed to do so), we have no good reason to believe that its actions are expressive of anything at all.
只要我们能够用另一种方式解释机器人的行为模式（即它的设计及方案要求如此），我们便无法相信机器人的行为能自如地表达任意想法。
Put differently: (i) because the robot has a different developmental origin to a human lover and/or (ii) because it is ultimately programmed (and controlled) by others, who might have ulterior motives, there is no reason to think that you are in a meaningful relationship with it.
换句话说，（1）由于机器人与人类的发展起源不同，且/或（2）机器人最终是由他人预设或控制的，设计者可能利用机器人别有所图。因此，人机恋是毫无意义的。
But (i) is difficult to justify in this context. Unless you think that biological tissue is magic, or you are a firm believer in mind-body dualism, there is little reason to doubt that a robot that is behaviourally and functionally equivalent to a human cannot sustain a meaningful relationship. There is, after all, every reason to suspect that we are programmed, by evolution and culture, to develop loving attachments to one another. It might be difficult to reverse-engineer our programming, but this is increasingly true of robots too, particularly when they are programmed with learning rules that help them to develop their own responses to the world.
但是，第一点难以被辩证。除非你认为人的生物组织是凭空出现的魔法，又或者你坚信身心二元论，否则不太可能质疑一个功能与行为都与人类无异的机器人无法保持有意义的联结关系。毕竟，我们也完全有理由怀疑，人类是受文化进化“编码”而成，从而诞生了一颗能够彼此相爱的心。或许我们很难“逆向改变”，但机器人也越渐如此——尤其当它们被设置为能够通过机器学习来改进对周围世界的反馈时。
The second element (ii) provides more reason to doubt the meaningfulness of robot relationships, but two points arise. First, if the real concern is that the robot serves ulterior motivesand that it might betray you at some later point, then we should remember that relationships with humans are fraught with similar risks. As the philosopher Alexander Nehamas points out in On Friendship (2016), this fragility and possibility of betrayal is often what makes human relationships so valuable. Second, if the concern is about the ownership and control, then we should remember that ownership and control are socially constructed facts that can be changed if we think it morally appropriate. Humans once owned and controlled other humans but we (or at least most of us) eventually saw the moral error in this practice. We might learn to see a similar moral error in owning and controlling robots, particularly if they are behaviourally indistinguishable from human lovers.
第二点让我们有更多理由去质疑人机恋的意义，但同时我们也需要思考一下两点。首先，如果我们真的担心机器人会被人利用，担心它会在将来的某天背叛我们，那么我们也得记住人类的关系也面对着同样的风险。正如哲学家亚历山大·尼赫玛斯在《论友谊》一书中指出，正是因为脆弱并存在被背叛的风险，人们的感情才显得弥足珍贵。其次，如果我们担心的是机器人的所有权和控制权，那么我们得明白，这种我们认为道德正确的所有权和控制权是由社会建构的并不稳定的。一部分人类曾经也占有并控制其他人类，但最终我们发现这是一种道德错误（至少大部分人是如此）。如果我们试图占有并控制机器人，特别是当机器人在行为上与人类伴侣无异时，我们也会发现自己在犯下同样的道德错误。
ulterior motive/purpose etc.a reason for doing something that you deliberately hide in order to get an advantagefor yourself 别有用心
The argument above is merely a defence of the philosophical possibility of robot lovers. There are obviously several technical and ethical obstacles that would need to be cleared in order to realise this possibility. One major ethical obstacle concerns how robots represent (or performatively mimic) human beings. If you look at the current crop of robotic partners, they seem to embody some problematic, gendered assumptions about the nature of love and sexual desire. Azuma Hikari, the holographic partner, represents a sexist ideal of the domestic housewife, and in the world of sex dolls and sexbot prototypes, things are even worse: we see a ‘pornified’ ideal of female sexuality being represented and reinforced.
以上的观点仅仅是在哲学层面对机器爱人的辩护。真正实现这种可能很明显还需要解决一些技术和道德上的阻碍。其中一个主要的道德阻碍在于机器人如何代表（或者行为上模仿）人类。如果你观察现在的机器人伴侣，他们似乎在关于爱和性欲的性别假设上存在问题。全息投影伴侣Azuma Hikari (因为前面用了英文，我这儿就follow了)代表了对于家庭主妇的性别歧视；而在性玩偶和性机器人的世界里，情况则更糟：我们看到机器人呈现和加强了“色情化”的女性性征。
This has a lot of people worried. For instance, Sinziana Gutiu, a lawyer in Vancouver specialising in cyberliability, is concerned that sexbots convey the image of women as sexual tools:
有很多人在担心这个问题。例如森济娅娜·古提——温哥华网络责任专业的律师——担心性爱机器人会传达女人就是性工具的观念：
To the user, the sex robot looks and feels like a real woman who is programmed into submission … The sex robot is an ever-consenting sexual partner …
对于用户来说，性爱机器人就像一个因编程而服从的真实女人……性爱机器人永远都会是一个心甘情愿的性伴侣……
Gutiu thinks that this will enable users to ‘act out rape fantasies and confirm rape myths’. Kathleen Richardson, a professor of ethics and culture of robotics at De Montfort University in Leicester and the co-founder of the Campaign Against Sex Robots, has similar concerns, arguing that sexbots effectively represent women as sexual commodities to be bought and sold. While both these critics draw a link between such representations and broader social consequences, others (myself included) focus specifically on the representations themselves. In this sense, the debate plays out much like the long-standing debates about the moral propriety of pornography.
古提认为，这将能够使用户‘宣泄强奸的幻想并实现强奸的荒诞想法’。凯瑟琳·理查德森是莱斯特德蒙福特大学机器人伦理和文化专业的一名教授，她同时也是打击性机器人运动的共同发起人。她同样担心性爱机器人把女性表现成待售的性商品。当这两种批评将表现形式和深远的社会结果联系起来时，其他人（包括我）则特别关注在表现形式本身。从这个角度看，这更像是长久以来关于色情影片道德问题的争论。
Let’s set the concerns about consequences to one side for now, and consider whether there is something representationally disturbing about robot lovers. Do they necessarily convey or express problematic attitudes toward women (or men)? To answer that, we need to think about how symbolic practices and artefacts carry meaning in the first place. Their meaning is a function of their content, ie what they resemble (or, more importantly, what they are taken to resemble by others) and the context in which they are created, interpreted and used. There is a complex interplay between content and context when it comes to meaning. Content that seems offensive and derogatoryin one context can be empowering and subversive in another. Videos and images that depict relationships of subordination and domination can be demeaning in certain contexts (eg, when produced and consumed by purveyors of mainstream hardcore pornography), but carry a more positive meaning in others (eg, when produced and consumed by members of the BDSM community or by proponents of ‘feminist pornography’).
让我们先把对于后果的担忧放在一边，想想机器情人是否有什么明显令人讨厌的地方。他们真的传达或表达了对女人（或男人）有问题的态度吗？为了解答这个问题，我们需要思考象征性行为和人工制品一开始是如何变得有意义的。他们的意义其实是内容的一种功能：例如他像什么（或者，更重要的，他们被别人拿来比作什么），以及他们在什么背景下被创造、解读和使用。在谈及意义时，内容和背景之间存在一种复杂的相互作用。在一种背景下看起来冒犯和不敬的内容，在另一种背景下会变得有力和具有颠覆性。在某些背景下（比如，由主流硬派色情影片的赞助商所生产和消费的背景），描述主从和支配关系的录像和图片是有损人格的，但在其他背景下（比如，由BDSM社区成员或者‘女权色情片’的支持者生产和消费的背景），它们有着更积极的意义。
derogatory/d?'r?ɡ?t?ri/ adj. derogatoryremarks, attitudesetc. are insultingand disapproving贬损的
This has implications for assessing the representational harms of robot lovers because neither their content nor the context in which they are used is fixed or immutable. It is almost certainly true that the current look and appearance of robot lovers is representationally problematic, particularly in the contexts in which they are produced, promoted and used. But it is possible to change this. We can learn here from the history of the ‘feminist porn’ movement, a sub-culture within pornography that maintains that pornographic representations of women need not be derogatory or subordinating, and that they can play a positive role in sexual self-expression.
这会影响评估机器爱人的代表性伤害，因为他们所使用的内容和背景既不固定也并非不可改变。几乎能确定的是，机器爱人的出现以及它现在的外观是有问题的——尤其是在它们的生产、宣传和使用的背景下。但这是有可能改变的。我们从‘女权色情片’运动的历史中学到，色情片内的次文化坚持认为，代表女人的色情产物不需要有冒犯之意，也不需要表示从属关系。它们可以在性表达上起到积极的作用。
To do this, proponents of the feminist porn movement pursue three main strategies: (i) they try to change the content of porn, so that it is not always from the male gaze, and so that it depicts a more diverse range of
(ii) they try to change the processes through which porn is created, making it more ethical and inclus and (iii) they try to change the contexts in which it is consumed, creating networks of feminist sex shops and discussion groups for marketing and interpreting the content.
为了传达这一理念，女权色情片运动的支持者致力于三大战略：（1）他们试图改变色情片的内容，这样一来就不会总是男性观看者居多，而且还能显得更多元；（2）他们试图改变色情片的拍摄过程，让它更合乎道德，包含更多女性的声音；（3）他们试图改变色情片的消费环境，创造出女权性商店网和讨论小组，以此推销和解读他们的理念。
A similar set of strategies could be followed in the case of sexbots. We could work to change the representational forms of sexbots so that they include diverse female, male and non-binary body shapes, and follow behavioural s (pre-programmed or learned) that do not serve to reinforce negative stereotypes, and perhaps even promote positive ones. We could also seek to change the processes through which sexbots get created and designed, encouraging a more diverse range of voices in the process. To this end, we could work to promote women who are already active in sextech. Finally, we could also create better contexts for the marketing and use of sex robots. This would require greater ‘consciousness raising’ around the problems of gendered harassment and inequality, and a greater sensitivity to the representational harms that could be implicated by this technology.
机器爱人可以遵循类似的战略。我们可以努力改变机器爱人所代表的样子，以此包含形形色色的女性、男性、或非二元身体；同时我们可以（通过默认程序或机器学习）让机器爱人符合行为规范——减弱负面的固定模式、甚至宣传积极正面的模式。我们还可以改变设计和生产机器爱人的过程、鼓励制造过程中多元化的声音。为此目的，我们可以努力宣传那些已经活跃在性科技领域的女性。最后，我们还能为推销和使用性机器人创造更好的环境。这需要人们提升对性骚扰和不平等问题的意识，也需要人们对可能会遭受此技术牵连的代表性问题更加敏感
We are already starting to do this, but it is undoubtedly an uphill battle that requires more effort. Given this difficulty, it is going to be tempting to slip back into calling for bans on the production of such content, but censorious attitudes are unlikely to be successful. We have always used technology for the purposes of sexual stimulation and gratification, and we will continue to do so in the future.
我们已经开始做这件事。但这场漫长而艰难的战斗无疑需要更多努力。由于这样的困难，退回到呼吁禁止生产那种产品是很吸引人的。但是一昧批评的态度是不太可能会成功的。一直以来，我们都通过技术来达到性刺激和性满足，而以后我们依旧会如此。
Concerns about the representational harms of robots often translate into concerns about their consequences. If robots represent or express misogynistic attitudes, the worry is that these attitudes will get reinforced in how users interact with real people. They will be inclined to sexual aggression and violence, be unwilling to compromise, and possibly become more withdrawn and misanthropic.
对于机器人代表性伤害问题的担忧，经常可以解读为对它们所带来的后果的担忧。如果机器人代表或表达了厌恶女性的态度，需要担忧的是这种态度在用户与现实生活中的真人互动时会变得愈发强烈。他们将会更倾向于性攻击和性暴力、会变得不愿妥协、也可能会变得更内向以及更厌世。
Obviously, the consequences of robot lovers would be extremely relevant to any debate about their desirability. If the consequences were clearly and uncontroversially negative, then this would reinforce any negative social meaning they might have, and provide us with strong reasons to discourage their use. If the consequences were clearly and uncontroversially positive (eg, because their use actually discouraged real-world sexual violence), then their negative social meaning could be reformed, and we might have strong reason to encourage their use.
很显然，机器爱人所带来的后果会和任何关于它们的欲望的争论高度相关。如果这些后果既明显又毫无争议是负面的，那这将深化所有它们可能代表的负面社会意义，并且会给我们足够的、拒绝使用它们的理由。如果这些结果明显且毫无争议是正面的（比如，由于使用它们而阻止了真实世界的性暴力），那么它们负面的社会意义可能会被改善，且为我们提供强力的、使用它们的理由。
The problem is that we don’t know which of these two possibilities is more likely right now. We don’t have any empiricalstudies on the effects of robot-lovers. One possibility follows directly from the claim that meaningful relationships with robots are possible. If this is correct, it means that the goods we currently associate with human relationships are also realisable in robot relationships. This could be a positive consequence because it would enable us to distribute these relationship goods more widely. The philosopher Neil McArthur at the University of Manitoba makes this point specifically in relation to sexual relationships, arguing that there are many people who are excluded from the possibility of entering into valuable sexual relationships with other human beings. If we grant that sexual experiences are part of the well-lived life, and that there might even be a right to sex, this should be seen as a problem. Furthermore, the problem goes beyond sex: people are shut out from other relationship goods too, such as companionship and care. It is not possible to resolve this imbalance in the distribution of relationship goods by trying to find a human partner for everyone, since doing so would probably require mass coercion or compulsion, but it might be possible to do so with robotic relationship partners.
问题是，我们不知道现在的情况更像哪种可能性。对于机器爱人，我们没有任何实证研究。一种可能性直接源于相信人和机器人之间可能存在有意义的关系。如果这种论调是对的，那这意味着现在在人际关系中产生的的益处在人机关系中也能实现。这可能是一个积极的结果，因为它能使我们更广地传播这些关系益处。马尼托巴大学的哲学教授尼尔·麦克阿瑟把这个观点和性关系直接联系起来。他表示很多人被别人排除在有价值的性关系之外。如果我们认同性经验是幸福生活的一部分，甚至性生活是每个人应有的权利，那么这应该被当成一个问题。此外，问题不止是性：人们同样被排除在如陪伴和关爱这样的关系益处之外的。通过给每一个人找一个伴侣来解决这种关系益处分配不平衡的问题是不可能的，因为这么做可能需要大范围的强制措施。但这可能在机器人伴侣身上实现。
empirical/?m'p?r?k?l/ adj. based onscientifictesting or practicalexperience, not on ideas基于经验的
In addition to this, it is a mistake to always think of robots as replaceme we could also view them as complements to existing relationships. The ideal of human intimacyholds that we should relate to one another on terms of equality. But this is often not possible. Robotic partners could help to redress these imbalances by providing third-party outlets that are less destructive of the human-to-human relationship because they might be less likely to be perceived as rivals.
此外，一直认为机器人是人类情人的代替品是错误的；我们也可以把它们当成现有关系的补充。理想的人类亲密关系包括我们应该平等地对待彼此。但这经常是不可能的。机器伴侣或许可以帮助改变这种不平等：作为第三方的一种宣泄口，它比起人对人的关系的破坏性更小，因为他们不太可能被当成对手。
In the coming decades, people will almost certainly be having relationships with more sophisticated robots, whatever we think about this. There is nothing intrinsicallywrong with loving a robot, and some forms of human-robot love could complement and enhance human relationships. At the same time, some could be socially destructive, and it is important that they are anticipated and discouraged. The key question, then, is not whether we can prevent this from happening, but what sort of human-robot relationships we should tolerate and encourage.
未来数十年，无论我们怎么想，人们几乎一定会和更多复杂的机器人发展出各种关系。爱上一个机器人本质上并没错，一些形式的人机爱恋还可能加强人际关系。但同时，另一些可能对社会造成破坏。而对这些爱恋的预测和阻止是非常重要的。那么，问题的关键就不在于我们是否能够防止它发生，而在于我们应该忍受和鼓励何种类型的人机关系。
intrinsic/?n'tr?ns?k/ adj. being part of thenatureor characterof someone or something 固有的、本质的
&原文链接：https://aeon.co/essays/programmed-to-love-is-a-human-robot-relationship-wrong&
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