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hermeneutic
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解释学，圣经注解学
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1. The origins of hermeneutic thought are traced through Western literature.
在解释学思想的起源已追查到西方文学.
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2. The phenomenology - hermeneutic consider that the understanding role of teachers is open state.
教师在与学生的互动中所理解、创生的角色是最根本的教师角色.
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3. Hermeneutic circle is a central thesis of hermeneutics.
解释学循环是解释学的核心问题.
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4. Reader ocalized, through textual theory and introspection interpreter explores hermeneutic c of suspicion.
阐释的意向性借助文本理论,反思层面,直指意义可望不可及的“希望之乡”.
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5. The phenomenology - hermeneutic consider that the understanding role of teachers is a wide - open state.
现象学—解释学认为教师理解者角色是一种敞开的状态.
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1. interpretive or explanatory
hermaphroditism 雌雄同体性hermeneutic 解释的hermeneutics 诠释学
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其书强调〈牟子理惑论〉一篇其实不是佛教教义的辩解性（apologetic）著作，而是儒家思想的诠释性（hermeneutic）论文。其立论 …
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...二一页)“反作用的”(retroactive)或“阐释的”(hermeneutic)阅读，这一阶段的阅读以非线性的方式展开，读者追寻产生文本非指涉意义的.
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...源于历史研究和人们寻求理解现象的意义的努力,这种“诠释的( hermeneutic) ”方法通过关注内部发生的事情,寻求理解事件的意义和事.
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1. 诠释循环
诠释循环(Hermeneutic circle)
诠释学的起源来自于西方宗教革命之争，路德教派不满天主教用其教义来理解圣经，认为应该由文本自 …
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2. 解释学循环
解释学循环(hermeneutic circle)指的是这样一种现象,即在理解文本过程中,要对文本整体形成理解,就必须理解其各个组成部分,而要对文.
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1. 法律解释学
现代法律解... ... ) Hermeneutic of law 法律解释学 ) legal hermeneutics 法律解释学 ) postmodern hermeneutics 后现代解释学.
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1. 阐释的循环
我们因此陷入了一种&阐释的循环&(hermeneutical circle)。一方面，我们要从浩瀚的历史材料中发现某种规律、现象、特点。
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1. 哲学诠释学
understanding music in the contex of philosophical hermeneutics ., 哲学诠释学语境中的音乐理解.
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hermeneutic
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解释学的阅读一般是出世
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1. The Law - Gospel dichotomy is absolutely necessary for a genuinely Protestant and Reformed hermeneutic.
对真正的更正教和归正宗的释经学来说,律法和福音的二分法是绝对必需的.
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& 2012 金山软件The&Hermeneutic&Motion翻译的阐释运作
The Hermeneutic Motion
By George Steiner
The hermeneutic motion, the act of elicitation and appropriative
transfer of meaning, is fourfold. There is initiative trust, an
investment of belief, underwritten by previous experience but
epistemologically exposed and psychologically hazardous, in the
meaningfulness, in the “seriousness” of the facing or, strictly
speaking, adverse text. We venture a leap: we grant ab initio that
there is “something there” to be understood, that the transfer will
not be void. All understanding, and the demonstrative statement of
understanding which is translation, starts with an act of trust.
This confiding will, ordinarily, be instantaneous and unexamined,
but it has a complex base.
阐释运作，即启发行为和意义的适当转换，使一种四重性行为。面对一篇文本甚至是对自己不利或者充满敌意的文本时，（译者）首先要对文本意义内涵和严峻性给予初步信任，也就是信心的投入。这种信任有赖于先前的经验，这在认识论层面是显而易见的，但是在心理上却存在一定的危险。我们且冒险向前跃出了一大步：我们一开始认为“那里的某些东西”需要理解，（对意义的）转换不会毫无意义。所有的理解，以及对这种理解的外在表述的翻译，都起始于一种信任行为。这种表达一般而言具有瞬时性，也没有经过验证，但是却具有非常复杂的基础。
It is an operative convention which derives from a sequence of
phenomenological assumptions about the coherence of the world,
about the presence of meaning in very different, perhaps formally
antithetical semantic systems, about the validity of analogy and
parallel. The radical generosity of the translator (“I grant
beforehand that there must be something there”), his trust in the
“other”, as yet untried, unmapped alternity of statement,
concentrates to a philosophically dramatic degree the human bias
towards seeing the world as symbolic, as constituted of relations
in which “this” can stand for “that”, and must in fact be able to
do so if there are to be meanings and structures.
这是一种操作习惯，它起源于一系列的表象假设（phenomenological
assumptions），包括对世界的整体性、非常不同甚至形式上相对的句法系统中展现的意义、以及类比和比较正当性的表象假设。然而在没有尝试和计划使用其他的表述之前，译者的宽宏（之前我就认为那里存在某些东西），也就是对“他者”的信任，从哲学的角度看，它很大程度上是人类的一种偏见，也就是把世界看做是符号性的，存在了某种可以用“这个”替代“那个”的关系，而且只要存在意义和结构，就可以有这种替代行为。
But the trust can never be final. It is betrayed, trivially, by
nonsense, by the discovery that “there is nothing there” to elicit
and translate. Nonsense rhymes, poesie concrete, glossolalia are
untranslatable because they are lexically non-communicative or
deliberately insignificant.
但是这种信任永远都不会是最终的。如果发现“那里不存在”需要启发和翻译的东西，根本不存在意义，那么这种信任也就受到了这种无意义导致的恶意背叛。无意义的音律、具体诗（poesie
concrete）、捏造出来的词组都是不可翻译的，因为他们从词汇角度上就不具备交流的特质，有可能是有意制作的这种无意义的表达。
The commitment of trust will, however, be tested, more or less
severely, also in the common run and process of language
acquisition and translation (the two being intimately connected).
“This means nothing” asserts the exasperated child in front of his
Latin reader or the beginner at Berlitz. The sensation comes very
close to being tactile, as of a blank, sloping surface which gives
no purchase. Social incentive, the officious evidence of
precedent—“others have managed to translate this bit before
you”—keeps one at the task. But the donation of trust remains
ontologically spontaneous and anticipates proof, often by a long,
arduous gap (there are texts, says Walter Benjamin, which will be
translated only “after us”). As he sets out, the translator must
gamble on the coherence, on the symbolic plentitude of the world.
Concomitantly he leaves himself vulnerable, though only in
extremity and at the theoretical edge, to two dialectically
related, mutually determined metaphysical risks. He may find that
“anything” or “almost anything” can mean “everything”. This is the
vertigo of self-sustaining metaphoric or analogic enchainment
experienced by medieval exegetists. Or he may find that there is
“nothing there” which can be divorced from its formal autonomy,
that every meaning worth expressing is monadic and will not enter
into any alternative mould. There is Kabbalistic speculation, to
which I will return, about a day on which words will shake off “the
burden of having to mean” and will be only themselves, blank and
replete as stone.
无论是从一般意义上，还是在语言习得和翻译过程中（这两者是紧密相关的），这种信任的付出都会或多或少的受到严格的检验。“这毫无意义”也证明了孩子在面对拉丁语读者的那种抓狂和初学者面对berlitz语读者时候的彷徨。这种感觉非常贴近那种触摸一种空白毫无抓手的斜面的感觉。社会上的刺激、以及先前的非正式的经验—“在你之前，已经有人尝试翻译这句话了”—都会让译者要做这项工作（付出信任）。但是从本体论上看，这种信任的付出是自然而然的，而且期望得到证明，但是有时候会有很大的差距（瓦尔特.本杰明说，有些文本只有在“我们之后”才可以进行翻译）。译者开始着手翻译的时候，就必须要在世界整体性和符号多样性方面进行赌博。与此同时，译者会将自身置于一种非常脆弱的，两种辩证相关、相互决定的超自然的危险境地下，虽然这只是在极端情况下和在理论的边际发生。他会发现“任何事”或“几乎任何事”都能意为“一切”。这就是中世纪的注释家们所体会的那种受自反隐喻和类比束缚而导致的晕头转向的感觉。或者他会发现那种“那里什么也没有”的状态可以和形式的自我状态相剥离，他会发现每一个有表达价值的意义都是单一的，不能成为二元可选的模式。我现在要重提Kabbalistic假设：某一天，词语都将摆脱“必须要有意义的负担”，他们就是他们自己，就像石头一样空白而完整。
After trust comes aggression. The second move of the translator
is incursive and extractive. The relevant analysis is that of
Heidegger when he focuses our attention on understanding as an act,
on the access, inherently appropriative and therefore violent, of
Erkenntnis to Dasein. Da-sein, the “thing there”, “the thing that
is because it is there”, only comes into authentic being when it is
comprehended, i.e. translated. [Paul] Ricaur, “Existence et
hermeneutique” in Le Confit des interpretations (Paris, 1969).] The
postulate that all cognition is aggressive, that every proposition
is an inroad on the world, is, of course, Hegelian. It is
Heidegger’s contribution to have shown that understanding,
recognition, interpretation are a compacted, unavoidable mode of
attack. We can modulate Heidegger’s insistence that understanding
is not a matter of method but of primary being, that “being
consists in the understanding of other being” into the more na&ve,
limited axiom that each act of comprehension must appropriate
another entity (we translate into). Comprehension, as its etymology
shows, “comprehends” not only cognitively but by encirclement and
ingestion. In the event of interlingual translation this manoeuvre
of comprehension is explicitly invasive and exhaustive. Saint
Jerome uses his famous image of meaning brought home captive by the
translator. We “break” a code: decipherment is dissective, leaving
the shell smashed and the vital layers stripped. Every schoolchild,
but also the eminent translator, will note the shift in substantive
presence which follows on a protracted or difficult exercise in
translation: the text in the other language has become almost
materially thinner, the light seems to pass unhindered through its
loosened fibres. For a spell the density of hostile or seductive
“otherness” is dissipated. Ortega y Gasset speaks of the sadness of
the translator after failure. There is also a sadness after
success, the Augustinian tristitia which follows on the
cognates acts of erotic and of intellectual possession.
信任之后就是入侵。译者的这个二重行为带有攻击性和并带有摄取的内涵。与此相关的是海德格尔的分析，他提醒我们，理解是一种行为，需要关注对从认知到此在的理解（erkenntnis
Dasein），这是一种内的适当行为，但存在一定的暴力性。此在（Da-sein），“那里的东西”，“那个东西因为在那里而存在”，存在仅当被理解、被翻译之后还成为一个真正的存在。所有的认知都具有侵入性，世界上所有的命题都具有攻击性，这就是黑格尔的假说。海德格尔的理论指出，理解、识别和解释密不可分、不可避免的攻击模式。海德格尔认为理解不是一种关于方法的东西，而是一种基本的存在，一种存在于对另一种存在的理解中的存在。我们可以将海德格尔的思想变通为一种更加简单、严谨的公理，即理解行为就是对另一个实体的占有（我们将其翻译成这样）。从词源学的角度看，理解这个词不仅是要进行认知性理解，而且还具有包容和吸纳的内涵。在语际翻译过程中，这种理解的操作具有明显的侵入性和穷竭性。Saint
Jerome利用了他的著名的形象，意义就是译者带回来的俘虏。我们“打破”一个符号：解码的工作是剖析性的，要打破外壳，剥掉关键的外衣。学生和优秀的译者都会有体会，意义的转换需要漫长而艰涩的翻译练习：他语中的文本几乎变得越来越薄，光线看起来可以毫无障碍的透过它稀疏的纤维。但是充满敌意或诱惑力的“他者”咒语却在弥漫。奥尔特加·加塞特（Ortega
y Gasset）说过译者在失败之后的悲哀。其实也存在成功之后的悲哀，即奥古斯丁的忧伤(Augustinian
tristitia)，这种忧伤紧随拥有情爱和理性之后。
The translator invades, extracts, and brings home. The simile is
that of the open-cast mine left an empty scar in the landscape. As
we shall see, this despoliation is illusory or is a mark of false
translation. But again, as in the case of the translator’s trust,
there are genuine borderline cases. Certain texts or genres have
been exhausted by translation. Far more interestingly, others have
been negated by transfiguration, by an act of appropriative
penetration and transfer in excess of the original, more ordered,
more aesthetically pleasing. There are originals we no longer
turn& to because the translation is of a higher
magnitude (the sonnets of Louise Labe after Rilke’s Undchtung). I
will come back to this paradox of betrayal by augment.
译者侵入、摄取，之后理解。这就像露天煤矿开采之后在大地上留下的伤痕一样。我们可以看出，这种掠夺是虚幻的，或者是错误翻译的一个标志。但是在另一方面，如果译者投入了信任，那么就一定存在边界。有些文本或题材确实被翻译进行了充分的挖掘。更加有趣的是，通过变形、适当的渗入行为和转换，他者的印象已经消除，原作从而变得更加有条理、更加善心悦目。有些时候我们不再理会原作，因为译作达到了一个更高的层次。我将重新来谈这种背叛的悖论。
The third movement is incorporative, in the strong sense of the
word. The import, of meaning and of form, the embodiment, is not
made in or into a vacuum. The native semantic field is already
extant and crowded. There are innumerable shadings of assimilation
and placement of the newly-acquired, ranging from a complete
domestication, an at-homeness at the core of the kind which
cultural history ascribes to, say, Luther’s Bible or North’s
Plutarch, all the way to the permanent strangeness and marginality
of an artifact such as Nabokov’s “English-languge” Onegin. But
whatever the degree of “naturalization”, the act of importation can
potentially dislocate or relocate the whole of the native
structure. The Heideggerian “we are what we understand to be ”
entails that our own being is modified by each occurrence of
comprehensive appropriation. No language, no traditional symbolic
set or cultural ensemble imports without risk of being
transformed.
第三个行为就是融入，很大程度上是词语的融入。具体的意义和形式的引入不是在真空中发生的行为。本土的语义场已经是个性鲜明、表达充分了。即便是完全的本地化，也就是作为文化历史核心问题的那种皈依，总也存在着同化和最新习得插入的阴影。比如，路德的圣经或者North的Plutarch，总是有如纳博科夫（Nabokov）的“英语语言”奥涅金这个词所反映出的陌生感和边缘感。但是不管“自然化”能达到什么程度，引入行为都可能改变整个本土文化的结构。每次全面理解之后，海德格尔
“我们就是我们所理解的那个样子”的说法就说明，每一次理解的侵入，都会对我们进行修改。任何语言、传统的符号系统和整体文化在引入的同时都不能摆脱变形的风险。这有两种暗喻，也许有些关系，一个是神圣的吸纳和具体化，另一种是感染。Here
two families of metaphor, probably related, offer themselves, that
of sacramental intake or incarnation and that of infection. The
incremental values of communion pivot on the moral, spiritual state
of the recipient. Though all decipherment is aggressive and, at one
level, destructive, there are differences in the motive of
appropriation and in the context of “the bringing back”. Where the
native matrix is disoriented or immature, the importation will not
enrich, it will not find a proper locale. It will generate not an
integral response but a wash of mimicry (French neoclassicism in
its north-European, German, and Russian versions). There can be
contagions of facility triggered by the antique or foreign import.
After a time, the native organism will react, endeavoring to
neutralize or expel the foreign body. Much of European romanticism
can be seen as a riposte to this sort of infection, as an attempt
to put an embargo on a plethora or foreign, mainly French
eighteenth-century goods. In every pidgin we see an attempt to
preserve a zone of native speech and a failure of that attempt in
the face of politically and economically enforced linguistic
invasion. The dialectic of embodiment entails the possibility that
we may be consumed.
而这种交流的价值根据接受者的道德、精神状态而递增。虽然所有的解码工作都具有侵略性，甚至在某种程度上具有破坏性，但是在占用的动机和“理解”的背景方面却有相异之处。如果本土语言结构处于无序状态或者处于成长期，那么这种外来言语的引入就不会丰富本土语言，因为它找不到一个合适的位置。它也不会创造一个完整的响应，而只能是一种简单的模仿（如在北欧、德国和俄罗斯的新古典主义法语版本）。但是受到古风或者舶来品的冲击，却对本土体制产生负面影响。过了一段时间，本土肌体会做出反应，努力进行中和甚至是将舶来品驱逐出境。欧洲的许多浪漫主义就是对这种污染的一种反击，可以看做是对大量外国的，主要是18世纪时期法国舶来品的一种排斥。每一种杨定浜式语言的发生，都可以看做对本土言语领地保护的一种努力，但是有着强大的政治经济背景的这种语言入侵都会让这种努力枉费心机。这一具体的辩证案例说明，我们可能被消灭。
This dialectic can be seen at the level of individual
sensibility. Acts of translat we come to
incarnate alternate energies and resources of feeling. But we may
be mastered and made lame by what we have imported. There are
translators in whom the vein of personal, original creation goes
dry. MacKenna speaks of Plotinus literally submerging his own
being. Writers have ceased from translation, sometimes too late,
because the inhaled voice of the foreign text had come to choke
their own. Societies with ancient but eroded epistemologies of
ritual and symbol can be knocked off balance and made to lose
belief in their own identity under the voracious impact of
premature or indigestible assimilation. The cargo cults of New
Guinea, in which the natives worship what airplanes bring in,
provide an uncannily exact, ramified image of the risks of
translation.
可以从个体感知层面来理解这种辩证关系。翻译行为为我们增加了手段，从而使我们能够将这种潜在的能力和感觉资源变得具体化。但是我们可能会受到这种外来词语的驱使，甚至变得无力。也确实有些翻译者血管中那种个人原始的创造能力变得干涸了。MacKenna
直接讲到Plotinus的时候，就掩盖了自我的存在。作家已经止步于翻译，而意识到此的时候却已经晚了，因为他们在吸入国外的声音的时候，却堵塞了自己的喉咙。那些固守陈旧的繁文缛节的会让社会失去平衡，受那些未成熟文化和无法消化的同化力量的影响，这些社会很容易失去对自身认同的信心。新几内亚的那种对舶来品的崇拜，即本地人对飞机带来的东西的崇拜，为我们提供了一个相当精确、形式多样的翻译风险的范例。
This is only another way of saying that the hermeneutic motion
is dangerously incomplete, that it is dangerous because it is
incomplete, if it lacks its fourth stage, the piston-stroke, as it
were, which completes the cycle. The a-prioristic movement of trust
puts us off balance. We “lean towards” the confronting text (every
translator has experienced this palpable bending towards and
launching at this target). We encircle and invade cognitively. We
come home laden, thus again off-balance, having caused
disequilibrium throughout the system by taking away from “the
other” and by adding, though possibly with ambiguous consequence,
to our own. The system is now off-tilt. The hermeneutic act must
compensate. If it is to be authentic, it must mediate into exchange
and restored parity.
这也是通过另外一种方式说明，阐释运作是危险且不完整的，危险是因为其不完整，如果没有第四阶段，就像活塞冲程，有了第四阶段真个循环才算完整。信任的先验性运作让我们失去了平衡。我们向冲突的文本“倾斜”（每一名译者都会经历这种明显的屈膝，并以此目标为起始）。我们在认知的角度上开始围攻和入侵行为。再次回归的时候，我们身负重担，并再次失去了平衡。我们从“他者”那里掠夺并加之于自己，这样就让整个系统失去了平衡，虽然可能后果会很模糊。这个系统现在是倾斜的。因此这个阐释行为必须得到补偿。真正的阐释必须居中调停进行交流，从而恢复平衡状态。
The enactment of reciprocity in order to restore balance is the
crux of the m&tier and morals of translation. But it is very
difficult to put abstractly. The appropriative “rapture” of the
translator—the word has in it, of course, the root and meaning of
violent transport—leaves the original with a dialectically
enigmatic residue. Unquestionably there is dimension of loss, of
breakage—hence, as we have seen, the fear of translation, the
taboos on revelatory export which hedge sacred texts, ritual
nominations, and formulas in many cultures. But the residue is
also, and decisively, positive. The work translated is enhanced.
This is so at a number of fairly obvious levels. Being methodical,
penetrative, analytic, enumerative, the process of translation,
like all modes of focused understanding, will detail, illumine, and
generally body forth its object. The over-determination of the
interpretative act is inherently inflationary: it proclaims that
“there is more here than meets the eye”, that “the accord between
content and executive form is closer, more delicate than had been
observed hitherto”. To class a source-text as worth translating is
to dignify it immediately and to involve it in a dynamic of
magnification (subject, naturally, to later review and even,
perhaps, dismissal). The motion of transfer and paraphrase enlarges
the stature of the original. Historically, in terms of cultural
context, of the public it can reach, the later is left more
prestigious. But this increase has a more important, existential
perspective. The relations of a text to its translations,
imitations, thematic variants, even parodies, are too diverse to
allow of any single theoretic, definitional scheme. They categorize
the entire question of the meaning of meaning in time, of the
existence and effects of the linguistic fact outside its specific,
initial form. But there can be no doubt that echo enriches, that it
is more than shadow and inert simulacrum. We are back at the
problem of the mirror which not only reflects but also generated
light. The original text gains from the orders of diverse
relationship and distance established between itself and the
translations. The reciprocity is dialectic: new “formats” of
significance are initiated by distance and by contiguity. Some
translations edge us away from the canvas, others bring us up
对翻译工作和职业道德而言，通过这种互补行为来恢复平衡非常关键。但是抽象的来描述这一点是非常困难的。译者“占有的乐趣”——这个词本身内部就已经暗含了暴力转移的词根和意义——使原作辩证的带上了高深莫测的痕迹。毫无疑问，在某些方面确实存在着丢失，我们已经看到了遗漏——因此，我们害怕翻译，如在许多文化禁止输出那些具有神圣性的文本、伦理性命名、公式等。但是剩余物也是具有决定性的积极意义的。这些被翻译的作品得到了升华。在一些相当明显的层面尤其如此。和所有的聚焦式理解模式一样，翻译是一种带有方法性、渗透性、分析性、枚举性的过程，它详细的解释、具象了其研究对象。释义行为的决定性在内在上是膨胀的：它说明“这里存在着比眼睛所能见到更多的东西”，“内容和决定形式之间的协同比我们所观察到的更密切、更细致”。把一篇源文本归入值得翻译的类别就如同直接夸大并使有了膨胀的动力（很自然的将其置于一种需要进一步审视的境地，甚至进一步解散的状态）。意义转移和释义的操作对原作进行了放大。在历史上，在文化的大背景下，就公众所能及的程度上，译作却往往更有影响力。这种影响力的增加有着更重要的意义。原文本和译作、仿作和主题变体甚至是模仿问题之间的关系错综复杂，不是某一种理论、定义所能解释的。他们对整个时间中的意义之意义、某种特定形式之外的言语现实效果和存在进行了归类。但是毫无疑问的是，这种回响式操作进行了丰富，而不仅仅是如同影子或者惰性摹拟体。我们又回到了镜子的问题，镜子不仅反射，而且发光。原作从错综复杂的关系中以及原作本身和译作之间建立的距离上获益。这种相互行为是辩证性的：意义的新“形式”始于距离和接触。有些译作避开背景，而有些译作却要说明背景。
This is so even where, perhaps especially where, the translation
is only partly adequate. The failings of the translator (I will
give common examples ) localize, they project as on to a screen,
the resistant vitalities, the opaque centers of specific genius in
the original. Hegel and Heidegger posit that being must engage
other being in order to achieve self-definition. This is true only
in part of language which, at the phonetic and grammatical levels,
can function inside its own limits of diacritical differentiation.
But it is pragmatically true of all but the most rudimentary acts
of form and expression. Existence in history, the claim to
recognizable identity (style), are based on relations to other
articulate constructs. Of such relations, translations is the most
即便翻译或许在某些方面是差强人意的，情况也是如此。译者的过失(我要用普通的例子)体现了抵制力量的活力，即源语中某些天才著作的模糊中心。这种失误似乎投射到了屏幕上一般。黑格尔和海德格尔提出：一物必须与另一物相关，才能使自我获得认知。这一推理只能当在语音和语法层面，一种语言在自身辩证的异质范围内才能发生作用。确实如此，不过这也是形式和表达方面最基本的行为。历史上的存在，也就是可以识别的实体（类型）都是建立在与他者之间的关系上。其中翻译是最明晰的这类关系。
Nevertheless, there is unbalance. The translator has taken too
much—he has padded, embroidered, “read into”—or too little—he has
skimped, elided, cut out awkward corners. There has been an outflow
of energy from the source and an inflow into the receptor altering
both and altering the harmonics of the whole system. Peguy puts the
matter of inevitable damage definitively in his critique of Leconte
de Lisle’s translations of Sophocles: “ce que la realite nous
enseigne impitoyablement et sans aucune exception, c’est que toute
operation de cet ordre, toute operation de deplacement, sans aucune
exception, entraine impotoyablement et irrevocablement une
deperdition, une alteration, et que cette deperdition, cette
alteration est toujours considerable.” Peguy Genuine translation
will, therefore, seek to equalize, though the mediating steps may
be lengthy and oblique. Where it falls short of the original, the
authentic translation makes the autonomous virtues of the original
more precisely visible (Voss is weak at characteristic focal points
in his Homer, but the lucid honesty of his momentary lack brings
out the appropriate strengths of the Greek). Where it surpasses the
original, the real translation infers that the source text
possesses potentialities, elemental reserves as yet unrealized by
itself. This is Schleiermacher’s notion of a hermeneutic which
“knows better than the author did ”(Paul Celan translating
Apollinaire’s Salome). The ideal, never accomplished, is one of
total counterpart or re-petition—an asking again—which is not,
however, a tautology. No such perfect “double” exists. But the
ideal makes explicit the demand for equity in the hermeneutic
然而还是存在着不平衡。译者也许涉入太深——他踏入原文、深入其中，读到了骨子里——或者他过于肤浅——只读到了皮毛、断章取义、盲人摸象。来自原作的能量和流入接受者的能量改变着双方，并力求在整个系统中实现和谐共生。Peguy在他对Leconte
de Lisle 翻译的Sophocles 的评论时指出：这是不可避免的一种伤害。Peguy Genuine
力求翻译实现平衡，但是征途漫漫、充满崎岖。和原作相比总是有所不足，而真正的翻译却要更加明确的展示原作的价值（Voss在展现荷马的典型中心观点时候却有不足，但是他这种明显的不足却展现了希腊的那种力量）如果译作超越了原作的话，那么真正的翻译就是要展现院中的那种潜在含义，自身没有表达出来的内涵。这就是施莱尔马赫的阐释论，也就是说“比作者更了解文本”而最理想的状态是和原作完全对等、全面重复——再次询问——但这不是本体论，但是这种理想状态重来没有实现。这种完美的“双重性”是不存在的。但这一理想却明晰了阐释过程的对等要求。
Only in this way, I think, can we assign substantive meaning to
the key notion of “fidelity”. Fidelity is not literalism or any
technical device for rendering “spirit”. The whole formulation, as
we have found it over and over again in discussion of translation,
is hopelessly vague. The translator, the exegetist, the reader is
faithful to his text, makes his response responsible, only when he
endeavours to restore the balance of forces, of integral presence,
which his appropriative comprehension has disrupted. Fidelity is
ethical, but also, in the full sense, economic. By virtue of tact,
and tact intensified is moral vision, the translator-interpreter
creates a condition of significant exchange. The arrows of meaning,
of cultural, psychological benefaction, move both ways. There is,
ideally, exchange without loss. In this respect, translation can be
pictured as a order is preserved at both ends
of the cycle, source and receptor. The general model here is that
of Levi-Strauss’s Anthropologie stucturale which regard social
structures as attempts at dynamic equilibrium achieved through an
exchange of words, women, and material goods. All capture calls for
sub utterance solicits response, exogamy and
endogamy are mechanisms of equalizing transfer. Within the class of
semantic exchanges, translation is again the most graphic, the most
radically equitable. A translator is accountable to the diachronic
and synchronic mobility and conservation of the energies of
meaning. A translation is, more than figuratively, an act of
double- both formally and morally the books must balance.
我想只有这样我们才能赋予“真实”这个关键的概念实质的含义。真实不是拘泥于字句，或者那种翻译“精神”的技术手段。我们在讨论翻译的过程中不止一次的发现，整个构成令人迷茫，看不到希望。译者、阐释者或者读者忠实于他的文本，对他自己的反应负责，并努力实现各种力量、完整表达的平衡，在这个过程中，他适当的理解是断裂的。真实不仅带有道德的意义，同时更全面的看，更有简约的需求。译者通过这种高超的手段（强化的手段就是道德）为交流创造了有力的条件。意义、文化和心理恩惠的指向都是双向的。这种交流的理想境地应该是没有损失的。因此，翻译可以被刻画为一种一致性的协调，在这个循环，源语和接受者之间，双方都保持了秩序。这种普通的模式就是Levis-Stuauss的人类学结构上所讲到的，社会结构就是通过语言、女人和物质货物的交流而达到的一种动态平衡。所有的战利品都需要后续的补偿；说话要求反应，异族结婚、同族结婚都是平衡转移的机制。在句法交流中，翻译是最明显、最关键的平衡行为。译者对意义能量的异时和同时的移动和保留都要负责。翻译是一种双入口行为，这绝对不是比喻。不管是在形式上，还是在道德上，文本都必须平衡。
This view of translation as a hermeneutic of trust (elancement),
of penetration, of embodiment, and of restitution, will allow us to
overcome the sterile triadic model which has dominated the history
and theory of the subject. The perennial distinction between
literalism, paraphrase and free imitation, turns out to be wholly
contingent. It has no precision or philosophic basis. It overlooks
the key fact that a fourfold hermeneia, Aristotle’s term for
discourse which signifies because it interprets, is conceptually
and practically inherent in even the rudiments of translation.
这种翻译观就是一对信任、融入、具体化、补偿的阐释，这可以克服那种支配这个学科历史和理论的单调的三重模式。直译、释义和自由限制之间的区别是完全随时可能发生的。这没有确切的和哲学的依据。这也忽视了四重阐释关键事实，这也是亚里士多德对语篇的定义。四重阐释在概念上和实际上嵌入在翻译中的基本原理。
--Selected from After Babel: Aspects of Language and
Translation, Chapter 5
以上网友发言只代表其个人观点，不代表新浪网的观点或立场。