能说说adaptation theory 和accommodation theory 的区别么?如果说adaptation theory 翻译为顺应理论那么accommodation theory 如何翻译?_百度作业帮
能说说adaptation theory 和accommodation theory 的区别么?如果说adaptation theory 翻译为顺应理论那么accommodation theory 如何翻译?
能说说adaptation theory 和accommodation theory 的区别么?如果说adaptation theory 翻译为顺应理论那么accommodation theory 如何翻译?
不从住宿那类意思找答案,从它别的意思考虑：1.适应：适应的行为或被适应的状态；调整2.方便,方便设施：可满足需要的东西；方便3.调和,两种相反观点的和解或调解所以应该翻译为适应理论、调和理论
条件理论吧英 [ 'θ??ri ]
美 [ 'θ?ri ]
Punishment cannot be discussed in isolation from social theory.
不能脱离社会理论孤立地讨论惩罚。
There were some holes in that theory, some unanswered questions.
那个理论中有一些漏洞，一些问题没有解答。
Did you ever swallow the conspiracy theory about Kennedy?
你有没有轻信过有关肯尼迪总统遇刺的阴谋论？
It sounds great in theory ... but in practice?
I could, in theory, play blind football.
However, Phantom Theory isblightedby a dodgy mid section.
Your plan sounds fine in theory.
你的计划在理论上听起来不错。
来自《权威词典》
There are many theories about the origin of life.
关于生命起源的学说有很多。
来自《权威词典》
He was studying music theory.
他在学习乐理。
来自《权威词典》
N-VAR 理论;学说
A theory is a formal idea or set of ideas that is intended to explain something.
搭配模式usu with supp
Marx produced a new theory about historical change based upon conflict between competing groups...
马克思创立了一种新理论，认为历史的演变是基于对立集团之间的冲突之上的。
Einstein formulated the Theory of Relativity in 1905.
爱因斯坦于 1905 年创立了相对论。
N-COUNT 观点;见解
If you have a theory about something, you have your own opinion about it which you cannot prove but which you think is true.
There was a theory that he wanted to marry her...
有人认为他想娶她。
My theory about divorce is that it's not the split-up that damages children, it's how it is handled.
我对离婚的看法是，伤害孩子的不是婚姻的破裂，而是处理离婚的方式。
N-UNCOUNT (实践科目、技能的)理论基础
The theory of a practical subject or skill is the set of rules and principles that form the basis of it.
搭配模式usu with supp
He taught us music theory.
他教我们乐理。
...graduates who are well-trained in both the theory and practice of statistics.
在统计学理论和实践两方面都训练有素的毕业生
PHRASE 从理论上说;照理说
You use in theory to say that although something is supposed to be true or to happen in the way stated, it may not in fact be true or happen in that way.
搭配模式PHR with cl
A school dental service exists in theory, but in practice, there are few dentists to work in them.
照理说，学校也有牙医诊所，可实际上，里面的牙医寥寥无几。
There are many theories about the origin of life.
关于生命起源的学说有很多。
理论, 原理
Your plan sounds fine in theory.
你的计划在理论上听起来不错。
意见, 看法
She has a theory that drinking milk prevents colds.
她有一种说法, 认为喝牛奶能防止感冒。
1. a well-substantiated explanation of some aspect
an organized system of accepted knowledge that applies in a variety of circumstances to explain a speci
" "theories can incorporate facts and laws and tested hypotheses" "
" "true in fact and theory" "
2. a tentative theory abo a concept that is not yet verified but that if true would explain certai
" "a scientific hypothesis that survives experimental testing becomes a scientific theory" "
" "he proposed a fresh theory of alkalis that later was accepted in chemical practices" "
3. a belief tha
" "the architect has a theory that more is less" "
" "they killed him on the theory that dead men tell no tales" "
1.理论：立足于某一技艺的学说或原则，以别于对该技艺的实践
2.学说，臆想：系统阐明的假说，泛言之，即指一切不是以确切认识为基础的设想或观点
1.理论相依性
2.theory-dependence
3.意义的理论负载性
4.theory-ladenness of meaning
5.负载理论的数据
6.theory-laden data
7.理论价值区分
8.theory-value distinction
9.负载理论的观察
10.theory-laden observation
11.观察的理论负载性
12.theory-ladenness of observation
13.渗透了理论的观察
14.theory-impregnated observation
used in describing what is supposed to happen or be possible, usually with the implication that it does not in fact happen 理论上（应该）；照道理
in theory, things in practice, they may well become a lot worse.
理论上情况只会变好，实际上却很可能变得更糟。
理论（theory）（Theory）：书里的著名开局、中局和残局局面。三次重复局面（Three-time repetition of position）：当棋手来回走子，重复同 …
- 基于33020个网页
术字的解释---在线新华字典 ... 法,法律〖 law〗 学说〖 theory〗 学习;实践〖practise〗.
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QC-QA-QE间的区别 - 豆丁网 ... Test piece 测试片 Theory 原理 Time stamp 时间戳印.
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theoretical 理论的theory 理论的there 那！你瞧（表示引起注意）那里，那儿在那里，往那里.
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Evolution theory
进化论 心理学专业词汇翻译辞典 - MBA智库文档 ... evolution 进化 evolution theory 进化论 evolutional 进化论的.
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chaos theory
混沌理论 混沌理论混沌理论（Chaos theory）是一种兼具质性思考与量化分析的方法，用以探讨 ... 导演：马科斯·西恩加 Marcos Siega 电影《 …
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hybrid theory
混合理论 2000年的“混合理论（hybrid theory）(Hybrid Theory)”开始，林肯公园(LinkinPark)以十年的时间，用无数的音乐奖项(世界音乐奖、葛莱美奖、告示牌音 …
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game theory
博弈论 博弈论”（Game Theory）引入中国的开山之人，做了大量有关博弈论“传道授业”的工作。
- 基于6103个网页From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
For other uses, see .
A concept is an abstraction or generalization from experience or the result of a transformation of existing ideas. The concept is
by all of its actual or potential instances, whether these are things in the real world or other . Concepts are treated in many if not most disciplines both explicitly, such as in , , etc., and implicitly, such as in , , etc.
When the mind makes a generalization such as the concept of tree, it extracts similarities fr the simplification enables .
In , and especially , a concept is a fundamental . In , there are at least three prevailing ways to understand what a concept is:[]
Concepts as , where concepts are entities that exist in the brain,
Concepts as , where concepts are abilities peculiar to cognitive agents, and
Concepts as , where objects are the constituents of propositions that mediate between thought, language, and referents.
The term "concept" is traced back to 1554–60 (Latin
– "something conceived"), but what is today termed "the classical theory of concepts" is the theory of
on the definition of terms.[] The meaning of "concept" is explored in mainstream , , , and . In computer and information science contexts, especially, the term 'concept' is often used in unclear or inconsistent ways.
Main article:
theory of mind, concepts are construed as abstract objects. This debate concerns the
status of concepts – what they are really like.
There is debate as to the relationship between concepts and . However, it is necessary at least to begin by understanding that the concept "dog" is philosophically distinct from the things in the world grouped by this concept – or the reference class or . Concepts that can be equated to a single word are called "lexical concepts".
Study of concepts and conceptual structure falls into the disciplines of , , and .
In the simplest terms, a concept is a name or label that regards or treats an abstraction as if it had concrete or material existence, such as a person, a place, or a thing. It may represent a natural object that exists in the real world like a tree, an animal, a stone, etc. It may also name an artificial (man-made) object like a chair, computer, house, etc. Abstract ideas and knowledge domains such as freedom, equality, science, happiness, etc., are also symbolized by concepts. It is important to realize that a concept is merely a symbol, a representation of the abstraction. The word is not to be mistaken for the thing. For example, the word "moon" (a concept) is not the large, bright, shape-changing object up in the sky, but only represents that celestial object. Concepts are created (named) to describe, explain and capture reality as it is known and understood.
Main articles:
declared that human minds possess pure or
concepts. Instead of being abstracted from individual perceptions, like empirical concepts, they originate in the mind itself. He called these concepts , in the sense of the word that means , attribute, characteristic, or . But these pure categories are predicates of things in general, not of a particular thing. According to Kant, there are 12 categories that constitute the understanding of phenomenal objects. Each category is that one predicate which is common to multiple empirical concepts. In order to explain how an a priori concept can relate to individual phenomena, in a manner analogous to an
concept, Kant employed the technical concept of the . He held that the account of the concept as an abstraction of experience is only partly correct. He called those concepts that result from abstraction "a posteriori concepts" (meaning concepts that arise out of experience). An empirical or an a posteriori concept is a general representation (Vorstellung) or non-specific thought of that which is common to several specific perceived objects (, I, 1., §1, Note 1)
A concept is a common feature or characteristic. Kant investigated the way that empirical a posteriori concepts are created.
The logical acts of the understanding by which concepts are generated as to their form are:
comparison, i.e., the likening of mental images to one another in relation to the un
reflection, i.e., the going back over different mental images, how they can be comprehended
and finally
abstraction or the segregation of everything else by which the mental images differ ...
In order to make our mental images into concepts, one must thus be able to compare, reflect, and abstract, for these three logical operations of the understanding are essential and general conditions of generating any concept whatever. For example, I see a fir, a willow, and a linden. In firstly comparing these objects, I notice that they are different from one another in respect of trunk, branches, leaves, further, however, I reflect only on what they have in common, the trunk, the branches, the leaves themselves, and abstract from their size, shape, thus I gain a concept of a tree.
— Logic, §6
Main article:
In , abstract concepts are transformations of concrete concepts derived from embodied experience. The mechanism of transformation is structural mapping, in which properties of two or more source domains are selectively mapped onto a blended space (Fauconnier & Turner, 1995; see ). A common class of blends are . This theory contrasts with the rationalist view that concepts are perceptions (or recollections, in 's term) of an independently existing world of ideas, in that it denies the existence of any such realm. It also contrasts with the empiricist view that concepts are abstract generalizations of individual experiences, because the contingent and bodily experience is preserved in a concept, and not abstracted away. While the perspective is compatible with Jamesian pragmatism, the notion of the transformation of embodied concepts through structural mapping makes a distinct contribution to the problem of concept formation.[]
Main article:
was the starkest proponent of the realist thesis of universal concepts. By his view, concepts (and ideas in general) are innate ideas that were instantiations of a transcendental world of pure forms that lay behind the veil of the physical world. In this way, universals were explained as transcendent objects. Needless to say this form of realism was tied deeply with Plato's ontological projects. This remark on Plato is not of merely historical interest. For example, the view that numbers are Platonic objects was revived by
as a result of certain puzzles that he took to arise from the phenomenological accounts.
, founder of the analytic tradition in philosophy, famously argued for the analysis of language in terms of sense and reference. For him, the sense of an expression in language describes a certain state of affairs in the world, namely, the way that some object is presented. Since many commentators view the notion of sense as identical to the notion of concept, and Frege regards senses as the linguistic representations of states of affairs in the world, it seems to follow that we may understand concepts as the manner in which we grasp the world. Accordingly, concepts (as senses) have an ontological status (Morgolis:7)
According to , in the introduction to his The History of the Calculus and its Conceptual Development, concepts in calculus do not refer to perceptions. As long as the concepts are useful and mutually compatible, they are accepted on their own. For example, the concepts of the
are not considered to refer to spatial or temporal perceptions of the external world of experience. Neither are they related in any way to mysterious
in which quantities are on the verge of nascence or evanescence, that is, coming into or going out of existence. The abstract concepts are now considered to be totally autonomous, even though they originated from the process of abstracting or taking away qualities from perceptions until only the common, essential attributes remained.
Main article:
, a concept is a mental representation, which the brain uses to denote a class of things in the world. This is to say that it is literally, a symbol or group of symbols together made from the physical material of the brain. Concepts are mental representations that allow us to draw appropriate inferences about the type of entities we encounter in our everyday lives. Concepts do not encompass all mental representations, but are merely a subset of them. The use of concepts is necessary to cognitive processes such as , , , , and .[]
Main article:
The classical theory of concepts, also referred to as the empiricist theory of concepts, is the oldest theory about the structure of concepts (it can be traced back to Aristotle), and was prominently held until the 1970s. The classical theory of concepts says that concepts have a definitional structure. Adequate definitions of the kind required by this theory usually take the form of a list of features. These features must have two important qualities to provide a comprehensive definition. Features entailed by the definition of a concept must be both
for membership in the class of things covered by a particular concept. A feature is considered necessary if every member of the denoted class has that feature. A feature is considered sufficient if something has all the parts required by the definition. For example, the classic example
is said to be defined by unmarried and . An entity is a bachelor (by this definition) if and only if it is both unmarried and a man. To check whether something is a member of the class, you compare its qualities to the features in the definition. Another key part of this theory is that it obeys the , which means that there are no partial members of a class, you are either in or out.
The classical theory persisted for so long unquestioned because it seemed intuitively correct and has great explanatory power. It can explain how concepts would be acquired, how we use them to categorize and how we use the structure of a concept to determine its referent class. In fact, for many years it was one of the major activities in
– . Concept analysis is the act of trying to articulate the necessary and sufficient conditions for the membership in the referent class of a concept.[]
Given that most later theories of concepts were born out of the rejection of some or all of the classical theory, it seems appropriate to give an account of what might be wrong with this theory. In the 20th century, philosophers such as Rosch and Wittgenstein argued against the classical theory. There are six primary arguments summarized as follows:
It seems that there simply are no definitions – especially those based in sensory primitive concepts.
It seems as though there can be cases where our ignorance or error about a class means that we either don't know the definition of a concept, or have incorrect notions about what a definition of a particular concept might entail.
's argument against analyticity in
also holds as an argument against definitions.
Some concepts have fuzzy membership. There are items for which it is vague whether or not they fall into (or out of) a particular referent class. This is not possible in the classical theory as everything has equal and full membership.
found typicality effects which cannot be explained by the classical theory of concepts, these sparked the prototype theory. See below.
Psychological experiments show no evidence for our using concepts as strict definitions.
Main article:
Prototype theory came out of problems with the classical view of conceptual structure. Prototype theory says that concepts specify properties that members of a class tend to possess, rather than must possess. , , Mervis, , Anglin, and
are a few of the key proponents and creators of this theory. Wittgenstein describes the relationship between members of a class as family resemblances. There are not necessarily any necessary conditions for membership, a dog can still be a dog with only three legs. This view is particularly supported by psychological experimental evidence for prototypicality effects. Participants willingly and consistently rate objects in categories like 'vegetable' or 'furniture' as more or less typical of that class. It seems that our categories are fuzzy psychologically, and so this structure has explanatory power. We can judge an item's membership to the referent class of a concept by comparing it to the typical member – the most central member of the concept. If it is similar enough in the relevant ways, it will be cognitively admitted as a member of the relevant class of entities. Rosch suggests that every category is represented by a central exemplar which embodies all or the maximum possible number of features of a given category.
Theory-theory is a reaction to the previous two theories and develops them further. This theory postulates that categorization by concepts is something like scientific theorizing. Concepts are not learned in isolation, but rather are learned as a part of our experiences with the world around us. In this sense, concepts' structure relies on their relationships to other concepts as mandated by a particular mental theory about the state of the world. How this is supposed to work is a little less clear than in the previous two theories, but is still a prominent and notable theory. This is supposed to explain some of the issues of ignorance and error that come up in prototype and classical theories as concepts that are structured around each other seem to account for errors such as whale as a fish (this misconception came from an incorrect theory about what a whale is like, combining with our theory of what a fish is). When we learn that a whale is not a fish, we are recognizing that whales don't in fact fit the theory we had about what makes something a fish. In this sense, the Theory-Theory of concepts is responding to some of the issues of prototype theory and classic theory.
According to the theory of
(or "sensing concepts"), activation of a concept may be the main mechanism responsible for creation of phenomenal experiences. Therefore, understanding how the brain processes concepts may be central to solving the mystery of how conscious experiences (or ) emerge within a physical system e.g., the sourness of the sour taste of lemon. This question is also known as the . Research on ideasthesia emerged from research on
where it was noted that a synesthetic experience requires first an activation of a concept of the inducer. Later research expanded these results into everyday perception.
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