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蝎毒耐热蛋白对大鼠海马神经元电压门控性 钠通道电生理特性的影响 张晓芸
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淘豆网网友近日为您收集整理了关于GERSH - Kinesis os. A study of spiritual motion in the philosophy of Proclus [IN] [proclo]的文档，希望对您的工作和学习有所帮助。以下是文档介绍：GERSH - Kinesis os. A study of spiritual motion in the philosophy of Proclus [IN] [proclo] PHILOSOPHIA ANTIQUAA SERIES OF MONOGRAPHSON ANCIENT PHILOSOPHYEDITED BYW. J. VERDENIUS AND J. H. WASZINKVOLUME XXVIS. E. GERSHKINHZIZ AKINHTOXA STUDY OF SPIRITUAL MOTIONIN THEPHILOSOPHY OF PROCLUSLEIDENE. J. BRILL1973A STUDY OF SPIRITUAL MOTIONIN THEPHILOSOPHY OF PROCLUSS. E. GERSH4UNNERZITA KARLOVA v PrazePiirodov5deckA fakultakatedra fiozofie a dejin pfirodnich viidAlbertov 6, 128 43 Praha 2ICO: (来源：淘豆网[/p-7106696.html]), DIC: 001-; c UK 13-39, 4 - - . , ./LEIDENE. J. BRILL1973CONTENTSISBN go 04 03784 5Copyright 1973 by E.J.Brill. Leiden. NetherlandsAll rights reserued. No part of this book may be reproduced ortranslated in any form. by print. photoprint. microfilm. microficheor any other means without written permission from the publisherPRINTED IN HERLANDSI MOTIONI 7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . .(a) The problem of spiritual mo(来源：淘豆网[/p-7106696.html])tion 7. . . . . . . . . . . .(b) History of interpretation 11(c) The relation of mind and object in the philosophy of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Proclus 16(d) Neoplatonic logic 24. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .I1. POWER 27(a) The concept of 'emanation' 27. . . . . . . . . . .(b) Three technical terms 30. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .(c) The ontologicalstatus of power 38. . . . (来源：淘豆网[/p-7106696.html]). . . . . .(d) The different varieties of power 41(e) pleteness and non-being 46. . . . . . . . . .I11 CAUSATION 49. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..(a) The triad of remaining. procession. and reversion . . 49(b) The circular motion of the effect . . . . . . . . . 53. . . . . . . . . .(c) The circular motion of power 60(d) Philosophical problems of the cycle. . . . . . . . 73. . . . . . . . .(e) The hypostatization of the triad 78. . . . . . .(来源：淘豆网[/p-7106696.html]) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .IV. ACTIVITY 81. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .(a) Circular activity 81. . . . . . . . . . . . .(b) The concept of hvuhoyia 83(c) The simile of light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90(d) Activity and the continuum of power 94. . . . . . .(e) Ontologicalquestions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..V MOTION11 I03. . . . . . . . . . . . .(a) Motion and multiplicity I03. . . . . . . . . . . .(b) T(来源：淘豆网[/p-7106696.html])he hierarchy of movers 106. . . . . . . . . . . . .(c) An objection considered III. . . . . . . . . . . .(d) Multiplicity and difference 11.5VI CONTENTS(I) tpwq as a cosmicprocess. . . . . . . . . . . . . 123(XI)otb0un6o~u~oobaiu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128BIBLIOGRAPHY(a) Texts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136(b) Modernworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136PREFACEThis study is devoted to a central problem in the philosophyof P(来源：淘豆网[/p-7106696.html])roclus, that of 'spiritual motion'. Its subject-matter consistsmore precisely of a group of dynamic metaphysical concepts.Its method is that of philosophical analysis, for it aims to he relationship of these concepts to one another within Proclus'general ontological andlogical scheme.Ihope that it can be consider-ed to break new ground from both these points of view, sincethe subject-matter has perhaps not been investigated with sufficie(来源：淘豆网[/p-7106696.html])ntcare in the past, while the few earlier discussions have been mainlydescriptive and historical in method, making little pretence tophilosophical evaluation.The result is a rather abstract study. This is, I am afraid, in-evitable in the case of an analysis of fundamental principles,for the most basic assumptions of any metaphysical system arelikely to be abstract, and this is particularly the casewith a philos-opher of the Athenian School of Neopla(来源：淘豆网[/p-7106696.html])tonism. However, theexplanation of fundamental principlesis essential during the earlieststages in the process of corning to understand a philosopher'sdoctrines, and the study of Proclus, despite some significantadvances in the last fifty years, is still very much in its infancy.I must express my indebtedness to Prof. W. K. C. Guthrie ofCambridge and to Prof. W. Beierwaltes of Miinster. Both of thesescholars gave up their valuable time in readin(来源：淘豆网[/p-7106696.html])g substantial portionsof an earlier draft of this work, and made many helpful suggestionsabout its content and presentation. I have also gained much fromthe discussion of certain problems with Dr D. O'Brien, and withouthis constant encouragement this study might never have beenpublished.University of Cambridge%pt. I972S.E.G.CITATIONS INTRODUCTION(a) TEXTS: Citations from the Elements of Theology are by thepages and fines of Dodds' edition (c(来源：淘豆网[/p-7106696.html])f. BIBLIOGRAPHYp. 136).The PEatonic Theology is cited according to the pages of the editionof Portus (1618). At the time of writing, only the first book hasappeared in the new edition of Saffrey and Westerink, and topreserve uniformity I have continued to cite Portus' pages evenwhen using the text of the modern version. Saffrey and Westerinkquote the earlier numbering in their inside margin. Citations fromthe mentary are by the paragraphs and lines ofWesterink's edition, while mentaries on the Cratyhs,Republic, and Timaeus are cited according to the volumes, pages,and lines of the Teubner texts. The same applies in the case ofthe mentary.Citations from the mentaryare by the columns and lines of Cousin's edition, and those fromthe De Providentia follow the paragraphs and lines of Boese.(b) MODERN WORKS:Full titles of modern works are onlygiven on their first occurrence in the main text or footnotes.Thereafter, they are simply cited by the author's name and thedate of publication (e.g. Trouillard 1971)~except in cases wherethere are several publications from the same year. For full detailsof all modern works cf. BIBLIOGRAPHYI). 136.The subject of this study is that of spiritual motion in the phil-osophy of Proclus. The adjective 'spiritual' has been employedin order to distinguish the type of motion under discussion fromthe sensible or physical variety. Exactly what the implicationsof the contrast between the two orders of motion are will be discuss-ed later. For the time being, we need only say that spiritual motionis that form of motion which Proclus attributes to the entitieswithin his system which form the content of the spiritual world,that is to say (in ascending order of importance) intellects, lives,beings, henads, and finally at the head of this hierarchy the FirstInfinity, and the First Limit. The One is excluded from this survey,for it transcends every category which will be employed in thediscussions. At the other end of the scale, souls are also excluded,for with these a new factor emerges, that of their activity in time,which would take the present study beyond the available limits.Proclus, like Plato before him, has as a fundamental postulate ofhis philosophy a twofold division into the sensible and the intelli-gible. For theNeoplatonists, motion can take place in either realm,and it is the present aim to consider its operation in the 1atter.lAt this stage, one may justifiably be tempted to pose two ques-tions. In thefirst place, why should spiritual motion be chosen as asubject ? The field of Neoplatonisrn is a large one, and it has neverbeen studied in depth as have earlier periods of ancient thought.Why then should time be spent on the minute analysis of a specificproblem, when wider and more general surveys are still muchneeded? In the second place, why should this particular subjectbe studied in the writings of Proclus, a representative of the lastThroughout the argument, I shall empIoy the expression 'spiritualmotion' rather than 'intelligible motion' (as one might be led to expect inview of traditional PIatonic terminology) to contrast with 'sensible motion'.The reason for this substitution is that in the case of Proclus, the term'intelligible' ( v o q d ~ )normally appries to a smaller part of reality than insome other Neoplatonic writings. For Proclus, the term is restricted tothe hypostasis of Being and should not, strictly speaking, be applied tothose of Life and Intellect. Although he occasionally gives it the widermeaning when explaining specific texts of Plato, it is perhaps best for theinterpreter to employ some other term in connection with supra-sensiblereality as a whole.2 INTRODUCTIONschool of Neoplatonism, and a less well-known thinker than hispredecessor Plotinus ? Would not a more generalsurveybe e in his case?The answertothefirst question liespartly in the fact that spiritualmotion is in a sense the pivot upon which the whole Neoplatonicsystem revolves, and is crucial to the understanding of everyphilosopher between Plotinus and Damascius (and indeed of someearlier and many later thinkers). It is the highest form of motionandthemodel onwhich the motion of thesensibleworld ispatterned.It is the highest form of causation,inwhich spiritualentitiesexercisetheir causal function not by conscious thought, but by spontaneousand unwilled creativity. Thus, in the interpretation of the Neo-platonists, the Platonic Demiurge is not a reasoning creator, es instead a source of emanative power at the head of acausal process. In the system of Plotinus, the first stage in thisprocess and the paradigm for the next is the motion of Intellect,for once Intellect has reached plete form, it begins toproduce the next hypostasis, Soul, in its turn. In the later Neo-platonists, the whole process is plicated, and the spiritualmotion is subdivided into further stages,Not only is the concept of spiritual motion so important in thestructure of the Neoplatonic system as a whole, but it is alsoproblematic. This has been demonstrated recently by Armstronglwho, although directing his attention specifically to Plotinus,raises questions which are of crucial importance for the under-standing of all the Neoplatonists.Armstrong draws attention to the apparently contradictoryremarks which Plotinus frequently makes when he is describingthe nature of Intellect2 in his system. On the one hand, thereare many passages which refer to the absolutely changeless characterof this hypostasis, yet at the same time, other passages refer to itin terms which imply a temporal history, for it proceeds from andreverts upon the One, and itengages in self-contemplation.Speaking1 A. H. Armstrong: 'Eternity, Life and Movement in Plotinus' Accountsof NOYC', La N.dopZatonzsme (report of the International Conference onNeoplatonism held at Royaumont, 9-13 June 1969), Paris 1971,pp. 67-74.Since Plotinus' hypostasis of Intellect is equivalent not only to Proclus'hypostasis of the same name, but also to the latter's hypostases of Beingand Life, any problems arising in this connection will be reproduced andmagnified for the later philosopher.INTRODUCTION 3of the passageswhich dealwith procession and reversion,he writes :l'And I find it (perhaps because I have an obtuse and time-boundmind) impossible to translate this whole doctrine, which is certainlyexpressed in time-lmguage, into non-durational terms. It seems toimply that Intellect has a history of at least two episodes, and thatsomething happens to it,when it should have no history and nothingshould happen to it at all.'He finds a similarproblem in the passageswhich deal with self-contemplation, for he continues: 'But itseems to me that he has in these passages irrevocably introducedinto his account of the eternal life of Intellect the idea of intellectualtravel and exploration, and so of duration and ession.' Fromall this, he concludes that Plotinus' account of the nature of thishypostasis is inconsistent, because he is attempting oo much both in terms of philosophical ideas derived from thetradition before him, and in terms of those derived from his ownexperience.The concept of spiritual motion in fact represents one of themost syncretistic of all the aspects of Neoplatonic doctrine (whichis undoubtedly one of the principal reasons for its extreme diffi-culty),andit embraces not only Platonic and Aristotelian, but alsoStoic elements. These influences have been carefully identifiedand examined by Hadot,s but perhaps they should be noted verybriefly.Plato's celebrated discussion of the nature of Being and of theso-called ma~ i v ~inspired the analysis of the spiritual worldpursued at such length by the Neoplatonists. Plato had associatedBeing with Life and Intelligence, and this authority was sufficientto link the three concepts together more or less permanently inthe minds of Plotinus and his essors. There may have beenarguments about the extent to which these were merely logicallydistinguishable aspects of one hypostasis or else separate hypostases,1 Armstrong, op. cit. J. 71.- -8 Armstrong, op. cit. p. 73.P. Hadot: 'fitre, Vie, Pensee chez Plotin et avant Plotin', EntretiensHardt 5, Vandoeuvres-Genkve 1960, pp. 105-141 This important article,to which I am indebted throughout the following summary, traces thevarious influences on Plotinus' formulation of the theory of Intellect.Hadot discusses not only the obvious debts to Plato and hristotle (ac-knowledged, of course, by p loti nus himseli), but also the influence of certainsyncretistic material which (he argues) formed the content of variousmanuals of philosophical learning in use in the schools at that period.4 INTRODUCTIONbut no philosopher in the Platonic tradition doubted the inseparableconnection between the three elements in this triad.l Again, Platohad associated Being with, in the first place, Rest and Motion,and in the second place, Sameness and Difference, and these fivebecame for the Neoplatonists the 'categories' of the spiritualworld.a These terms were also interpreted in different ways byvarious~philosopherswithin the school, but nobody doubted thegeneralapplicability of the five, or their relationship to one another.Plato, however, had only shown which concepts were to berelated, and had failed to provide the philosophical means bywhich such a relation could be effectively brought about. TheAristotelian concept of &.vtpysca, particularly asused in the theology,provided just such a means,3 for when applied to the supremedivinity it united Being and Intelligence, the union itself beingdescribed as the highest Life. Undoubtedly the Neoplatonists(anxious as always to vindicate the authority of Plato) wouldhave claimed that there was nothing in the Aristotelian concept iof Activity which was not already in the Platonic concept of Motion(that is to say, the antithesis of Rest as mentioned earlier), andthis is probably the main reason for the confusion of the two termswhich is mon in the writings of Plotinus. IThe third stage in the philosophical synthesis was the cornbina-tion of these Platonic and Aristotelian elements with ideas derivedfrom Stoic sources. The Aristotelian notion of Activity produced aIdynamic interpretation of Being which went a considerable waytowards providing the Neoplatonists with a philosophical basisIfor their notion of spiritual Life, but not far enough. In fact, theyrequired something more elaborate, and they found what theyneeded in the Stoic idea of the motion constituting the msCjyu.I--Iadot4has summarized the relationship between the oncept of Life and the Stoic theory inctly as follows: 'Ellecorrespond A une transposition platonicienne, c'est-Mire A une&vation au plan m6taphysique de la conception stoic'ienne dumouvement alternatif constitutif de l'etre, mouvement appel6par les stolciens TOVLX~) X ~ V ~ C C L S . 'Aristotle had merely shown howMotion (that is to say, the Platonic bined with the1 Plato, Sophist 248e.Plato, Sophist 254c-255e.3 Aristotle, Metaphysics A7, .Hadot, op. cit. p. 135.Aristotelian notion of Activity) could be present in the spiritualworld, and the essence of his Activity was its uniformity. The oncept, on the other hand, has an implicit duality, and by applyingit to the spiritual world, the Neoplatonists felt that they modate plex varieties of motion within it. Whatform these plex varieties took will be explained later inthis study, but for the present we should note that the decidedlyphysical flavour of much of the Neoplatonic speculation about thespiritual world, and indeed of the concept of spiritual motion itself,is a result of the transposition of the Stoic physics into the meta-physical sphere.So much, then, can be said to justify an examination in detailof the concept of spiritual motion in Neoplatonism. However,there was a second question raised at the beginning which alsorequires an answer. Why should the present study choose toconsider the problem specifically from the standpoint of Proclus ?Perhaps this may be answered by saying that Proclus showsby the reasoned and deductive form of his discussions of thequestion, and by the regularity with which he returns to it through-out his writings, that he was above all attempting to provide arational explanation of the presence of motion within the spiritualworld. The structure of a treatise such as the important Elementsof Thdogy, consisting of a series of interrelated propositionsabout higher reality, shows this approach most clearly, and manyof Proclus' other writings contain equally careful argumentation.Therc seems to be no question of a purely religious or mysticalaffirmation of inherently contradictory ideas, but at all timessuch ideas must be brought within the realm of strict logic, orat least within the realm of logic as conceived by a Neoplatonicphilosopher of the period, Proclus' writings, therefore, provideus with the most carefully reasoned discussions of the problemof spiritual motion which we possess, a fact which makes an examina-tion of the topic from his viewpoint especially worth while.At this stage, a brief summary of the argument to follow maybe of assistance. The special nature of the evidence requires thatthe discussion should be essentially a deductive process ratherthan an accumulation of information as an end in itself, and sosome pointers to the main lines of development may be useful.The reasons for the choice of this particular order of topics will,I hope, also e clear.6 INTRODUCTIONFirst of all, the problem of spiritual motion is stated in the mostsimpleand paradoxicalform in which it appears in Proclus' writings.This discussion occupies the first half of Chapter I. After this,we move on to examiningthe conceptof spiritualmotion in consider-able detail, and this begins in the latter half of Chapter I andcontinues until the end of the study. This argument is subdivided,however, into several distinct phases, the first of these yieldingthe important notion of logical relation and occupying the latterhalf of Chapter I, the second being devoted to a detailed analysisof the different forms in which motion manifests itself in Proclus'system and continuing throughout the next three chapters, whilethe third returns to the question of logical relation and showsthe various precisions of the basic idea which he makes, this upying the first half of Chapter V. In the second half of thischapter, some possible objections to the proposed interpretationare considered and answered, and the whole discussion concludeswith a brief summary of some of the most significant featuresof Proclus' theory. His doctrine of spiritual motion paredwith ideas onthe samesubject held by other philosophers, especiallyby Plotinus, and his probable contribution to the developmentof the subject isbriefly assessed. In the courseof the main argument,certain subordinate aspects of the theory of spiritual motionare revealed, and the discussion of these is removed from the maintext to appendices.CHAPTER OXEMOTION I(a) The problem of spiritual nzotionOne of the most interesting metaphysical doctrines of Proclusis his theory that there are certain entities which are crb8ux6o~am,a term which we may translate 'self-constituted'. The nature ofthese is expounded at considerable length in the texts, and we mayperhaps best begin our researches into spiritual motion by makinga brief outline of the theory.The most important point to note is that the self-constitutedare both atemporal and non-spatial. plete doctrine canbe extracted from four propositions in the Elements of Theology.Speaking of the atemporal aspect of these entities, Proclus writes(EL Th. 50. 1-2):zEv ~b a68ux6marov kEfipq.ca~TGV 3x6 xpiivoup ~ p o u $ v ~ vXU& 4 v 060iav.1 The non-spatial aspect is shown bining the following propositions: (i) (El. Th. 44. 11) XZV ~bahflux6ara~ovxpbq &am6 & ~ L VB ~ L ~ T ~ E ~ C Z L X ~ V ,(ii) (El. Th. 76. 22-3)&V &8a&pU'TW, xphq &aWCb ~ ~ F L D T ~ E X T L K ~ V6v, 3 ~ '& ~ U V ~ E Z E X ~ ~ E V O VXWPLOTB~p&xecat, and (iii) (El. Th. 86. 27) xZv u h o v X O ~ L G T ~ Y'x0:v~axoG2mw d p a xat o68apoLaThe postulation of atemporal and non-spatial realities was,of course, absolutely fundamental for Platonists, and went withoutsaying in most cases.' Normally, Proclus is content to speak of the1 The addition of the words xa& 4 v obalav to the formula is presumablyto allow Soul to be included in the category of the self-constituted. Soulperforms the role of an intermediary between the sensible and spiritualworlds, and to enable it to do so, Proclus makes it atemporal and temporala t the same time. Its atempord aspect is its existence, while its temporalaspect is its capacity to engage in discursive reasoning, cf. El. Th. 166, 27.a To draw conclusions by coupling propositions from different parts ofthe Elements of Theology together is very much in the spirit of the workitself, which is cast in the form of a series of interrelated propositions,proofs, and corollaries. The nature of the method of reasoning as a whole,and particdarly of the relationship between propositions, has been carefullyexamined by A. Charles: 'La raison et le divin chez Proclus', Revue dessciertcrss phdoso+hiqws et t ~ o l o g i q ~ e s53, 1969, pp. 460-468,The only passage I can find in Proclus' works in which there is an explicitlinking of the concepts of atemporality and non-spatiality to describe thenature of spiritual realities in general is Prov. 10. 10-11. Such a description8 MOTION I THE PROBLEM OF SPIRITUAL MOTION 9self-constituted a s 'eternal' (aibv~cr), t h a t is to say emphasizingthe atemporaI aspect a1one.l We find a typical description in mentary, and this passage is particularly interestingin that it gives plete classification of reality in terms oftime (in Tim. I. 2j5. zgff.) : Afyw 64 zPC5~w&&v d v a ~' ~ ba i h v ~ o vh i p ~ o vxu& x k v ~ a ,;rilv otoiav, R j v SSvay~v,vEpye~av,y ~ v y ~ b v6k .;b i v ~pbvo,,4 v 'FE 06oiav ~ ~ T O ~ E X ~ ~ E V O Vxai *V 8I)vapvx&aw %a\ +J i\lkpy&~aV'8s: ydlp ' ~ bykv dhov &haL ai&vLov, ' ~ b6kijko.~ilyilpovov, xu:. sb y&v a6Ouxoa'~&'~wq6 y o t xEv Spo.r&va~, ' ~ bSL& ~ K Z & - J +p.irj$vqv d p v R j v i v @jxapa~drocr5 x 6 m a o ~ v .7 0 3 7 ~ ~8; k p w v 6 v w v d v a ~x a i 'F& $oa, ~hxA $V q q 705 6 ~ 7 0 ~y e ' ~ ~ ~ A y y 6 ' ~ apoipxq, xA 8k X O I , V O V O ~ ~ V ~YEv&JEw~. d v u t 8k a3 xut ' ~ hp y 8 ~ d p 0 ~TOS'FOV ~E'F~XOV'FE,' ~ bpkv x a ~ h76 xp&'iooov, ' ~ b8i: xmh 76 XE~POV- x dydp 6hq o k dv i o r w 0 6 7 ~ysvq76v -0 6 ' ~ syhp v o 4 o a m p ~ A y n r b vo h saioOrj~6v-xai ~b Cv, (SGO i p y 6 ' ~ ~ p a~ E ~ X V U G L V6 IIappcvi8yq. The self-constituted have their existence, power, and activity in eternity,while those which 'depend upon others' (not self-constituted) havethese in time. Other entities mediate between these, and the Oneapplied to the Forms is not, however, mon, cf. in Parm. 861. 12-16,and ibid.873. I I -20. rn these passages, Proclus must explain this fundamentalassunlption to enable hlm to solve the problems about the participationof the Forms ikhich Parmenides raises. We may, of course, add that prises for Proclus a plenitude of Forms, then the hypostasisitself is by implication atemporal and non-spatial.When Proclus uses thc tcrm aEGv~og,he does not mean 'existing for thewhole of time' but 'transcending time'. This distinction is made perfectlyclear in numerous passages, cf. in Tim. I. 278. 9-10, ibid. IT. 147. 29-32,ibid. 111.3. 8-9, in Alcib. 4. 7-9. It is often used to explain how the Worldis everlasting, but that it does not, of course, transcend time. This qualityis reserved ii0~~xrSamru.For discussions of Proclus' theory of time which asscmble the maintexts cf. A. Levi: 'I1 concetto del tempo nelle filosofic dell'eth romana',Rivista critica di stwiu della filosofia 7, 1952, pp. 173-200; W. O'Neill:'Time and Eternity in Proclus', Phronesis 7, 1962, pp. 161-5; S. Sambursky:'The Concept of Time in Late Neoplatonism', Proceedings of the IsraelAcademy of Sciences and Humanities 2, 1968, pp. 153-167 which was laterincorporated in S. Sambursky and S. Pines: The Conceet of Time in LateNeoplatonism, Texts with Translation, Introduction and Notes, Jerusalem1971.a These include Nature, which is in different senses both somethingwhich e to be and something which is everlasting, and apparentlySoul. Perhaps there is a slight inconsistency, for here Proclus seems toimply that this middle group falls between the self-constituted and the notself-constituted, whereas it is a normal part of his doctrine that Soul isself-constituted. Perhaps we see the beginning of yet a further subdivisionin which Soul is partly self-constituted and partly determined by Intellect.Iand Matter fall outside the classification altogether being aboveand below the other groups respective1y.lSo much is clear. However, the doctrine es a little moreproblematical when we move on to consider exactly what we areto understand as being included in this general category. In otherwords, how does the usual stratification of reality into hypostasesfit in with the new classification presented in these passages intoself-constituted and otherwise? The texts which we have seen sofar do not provide us with plete answer, for these entitieswere discussed largely in the abstract. We must therefore look! elsewhere.Dodds2 has pointed out that Proclus assumes the identificationof the self-constituted with those principles which are termed'self-sufficient' (~MQxEL~)in the Platofiic Theology. In the firstbook, Proclus enters into a lengthy classification of the generalproperties of the gods, and es to consider the, question of their self-sufficiency. The gods, we are told, embodythis characteristic to the highest degree, whereas other spiritualentities (lower in the hierarchy of reality) possess this quality to alesser degree and in various different ways.3 The introduction ofdegrees of self -sufficiency increases the difficulties of interpretationconsiderably, but Dodds is probably correct in seeing this theoryas the key to the doctrine of the self-constituted as expoundedin the earlier passages. On this interpretation, they are to beunderstood simply as the contents of the spiritual world.4These spiritual realities are therefore beyond time and space,and it would be reasonable to suppose that, since motion requiresboth these categories as its essential basis or at the very leastthe first, Proclus would view them as being immobile. Indeed,1 According to Proclus' strict principles, it is possible that not all ofthc self-constituted should be described as 'eternal', for he distinguishes alevel of reality which is technically n p o a ~ h v ~ o ~ ,cf. Th. PI. 160. Speakingloosely, however, the self-constituted are everlasting.a E. R. Dodds. Pvoclus, The EEements of Theology, a Revised Text withTranslation, Introduction mentary, Second Edition, Oxford 1963.A t Th. PI. 50, Proclus says that Intellect is self-sufficient xard ~&OEELV,Soul X ~ T 'EMa&v, and the World X M T ~dp xpbq ~b Bziov 6 p o d q t a , whileonly the gods are self-sufficient in themselves. On the problemsof this relative seIf-sufficiency cf. A. C. Lloyd: 'The Later Neoplatonists',Cambridge Hislovy of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, editedby A. H. Armstrong. Cambridge 1967, pp. 308-309.4 Dodds, op. cit. pp. 196 and z24.I0 MOTION 1the classification of principles in terms of motion or its absencewhich we find in the Elements of Theology seems at first sightto bear this notion 0ut.lProclus divides reality first of all into two categories, but thengoes on to subdivide the latter, the result being that dvza fallinto three groups depending upon whether they are unmoved ormoved, and (in the case of the latter) whether the motive force isinternal or external in origin. The passage runs as follows (El. Th.16. 9-12): xEv 7.6 ilv 5j hxivq~6vionv $) x~vo6p~vov.xai ci x~vo6p~vov,3 6y' kau~ofj4 6nJ &Mou. xai d pkv 69' kau~o;, abzoxivq~6vEa~cv.~ i 8 B6x'gMou, k+rcpoxivqzov.x2v 6pa 5j &xivq~6v&GTLV5j ahoxivq-TOV 41j &TEPOX~V~TOV.Exactly which principles are intended to fallunder these headings is explained by a later proposition (El.Th.22. qff.) which informs us that Intellect is &xhjzoc, Soul x~voupivy69' iau6js buztpav &XELT&LV Tjjc & X L V ~ ~ Z O U(PJGEWS,and finally Bodyis69' iztpou X L V ~ T ~ V .It is the first of these three categories whichinterests us in the present context, for when Proclus marks off theimmobile from the other groups, he must intend this propertyto belong to the spiritual realm from the level of Intellect upwards.In this case, the category of the immobile will correspond broadlywith the earlier category 01the self-con~tituted.~It is here that we are faced with a real problem, for Proclusappears in many contcxts to associate motion with the immobilegroup. This motion is of two varieties, the first being a type ofmotion which one principle exhibits in relation to its prior, thesecond being a type of motion which it performs in relation to itself.We must examine these two form of motion very briefl~.~The first type of motion, which is directed externally, appearsin certain general propositions which Proclus formulates aboutcausation. In these propositions, he is clearly referring to the self-constituted, for these (prising the content of the spiritual1 There is a more extensive classification of reality in terms of motionat Th. Pi. 51, to which we shall return later on. The simpler classificationwill form the basis of our present discussion, for it has the advantage ofshowing more clearly the simple contrast between the immobile and themobile with which we are concerned.With, of course, the one exception that Soul is self-constituted andself-moving, i.e. not immobile.a For the time being, we need not elaborate the distinction betweenthe two varieties of motion too much. Our problem is the reconciliationof motion and immobility, and this applies equally in either case.THE PROBLEX OF SPIIIITUAL MOTION I11world) are the causes $ar excellence. The process of causationinvolves three stages, for (El. Th. 38. 9-10) x2v zb a i ~ ~ a ~ b vxu1~ L V E LLv ahoii uidql xai X P ~ E L W & X I ah7 xai ixcazptcps~xpbSabdjv. Furthermore, the whole process is described as one in which(El. Th.36. 11-12)xZv T& xpo~bv&x6 T L V O ~xai tnco~lvt ~ X E LT;Jv ivtpy~~av.The exact interpretation of these ideas willform the basis of a more extensive discussion later in this study,but at this point we should simply note the contrast betweenthe obvious dynamism of these propositions and the immobilecharacter of the self-constituted which has already been observed.iThese last two propositions dealt with the motion which oneprinciple undergoes in relation to its prior, but Proclus also speaksof the motion which it performs in relation to itself. This type ofmotion is explicitly attributed to the self-constituted which are(as pointed out at the beginning of the chapter) xpbs Ecru& im-azpenr~xt.We are not given very much information to allow usto form a more precise picture of this latter type of motion, butProclus generally speaks of it in the same terms as when he isdiscussing the more prehensible externally directedmotion.What is of really crucial significance is that the process whichforms the subject of these propositions is explicitly described byProclus as being a form of motion, for he adds (El.Th. 36. 13-15):EE y&p, &(p' 05 XP~ELGLV,& zoko i m b - r p k ~ ~ ~ ,CUV~XTEL&oc, Earn pta xui auvqfi~4 x i v r ~ ~ ~ ~ ,4~pkv &xb TO; pkvovzos,4 s 8t xpbs 76 pGvav y ~ ~ ~ p & v w .However, the principlcs whichundergo this process have already been declared to be immobile.I(b) History of InterpretationIt is now advisable to make a brief survey of the previous inter-pretations of this 'motion of immobility'.l Most earlier writersagree that the motion which is a fundamental characteristicof atemporal and non-spatial reality can only be understood assome type of logical relation. However, this concept of logicalrelation must be weighed carefully since it appears in two differentforms which we may call 'static logical relation' and 'dynamicI shall take these accounts in chronological order, without suggestingthat they necessarily add progressively greater clarification of the issuesII involved.f2 MOTION I HISTORY OF INTERPRETATION I3logical relation' respectively. The former notion signifies thatthe spiritual world is a fact, and it must be distinguished carefullyfrom the latter notion which shows that the spiritual world isa process. Some writers have not been careful to draw this distinc-tion, and speak loosely of 'logical relation'. However, it is onlythe dynamic form of this concept which can explain Proclus'spiritual motion, if we are to take his accounts literally.The first interpretation which we must consider is that ofLindsay.' In a stimulating account of the main features of Proclus'metaphysical system, Lindsay has occasion to consider the natureof the causal process which we were discussing at the end of thelast section. He warns us that 'quoiqu'il y ait un ordre de causalit6et que Son parle frkquemment de l'antbrieur et du postCrieur,les essions sont logiques, plut6t qu'historiques ou chrono-l~giques'.~We must not, he argues, be misled by Proclus' languageinto thinking that there is any prior or posterior in a chronologicalsense in the spiritual world, for he is of necessity employing thelanguage of metaphor. It is a pity that the writer did not go onto explain exactly what he meant by 'essions logiques', butfortunately the next interpreter provides us with some guide-lines.The ides of logical relation is taken up by RosAn3 who, however,evolves a much more elaborate theory. In this interpretation,which has been fairly influential in recent times, each stage inthe causal process is anaIysedinto logical terms, and ingeniously so.We shall therefore examine this view at somewhat greater length.RosAn discusses the fundamental assumptions behind Proclus'system very much in the abstract. These determine the natureof both the sensible and spiritual worlds, but the author shows usthat he is mainly concerned with their function in connectionwith the latter. This is, of course, the area that we are consideringin our present analysis.1 J. Lindsay: 'Le systhme de Proclus', Revue de mktaphysique et de morale28, 1921, PP. 497-523.Lindsay, op. cit. pp. 506-507.9 L. J. Rosbn: The Philosophy of Proclus, the Final Phase of AncientThought, New York 1949.RosAn speaks loosely of 'logical relation' through-out his account, but he is clearly making an advance in laying considerableemphasis on the dynamic aspect. Perhaps the main weakness of his versionis the tendency to polarize the logical and static on the one hand and theontological and dynamic on the other. The concept of 'dynamic logicalrelation' refuses such a sharp dichotomy.The causal relation between each principle and its prior formsthe starting-point for this interpretation, and he makes it quiteclear that 'we are primarily speaking of eternal relationshipsand not of causation within timeJ.lRosh then goes on to explainwhat he means us to understand by this causal relation, and itappears to contain two aspects which he describes as follows:'In the first place, we can affirm that it may be expressed by a if the existence of a mind-possessed-by-a-soulimplies the existence of a soul-possessing-a-mind, then the mind-possessed-by-a-soul will be the 'cause' of the soul-possessing-a-imind, which in turn will be its 'effect'. On the other hand, sincea soul-possessing-a-mind also implies a mind-possessed-by-a-soul,logical implication alone cannot be the only factor that constitutesa relationship for Proclus. But if we add to this the fact thatthe mind-possessed-by-a-soul gives power to the soul-possessing-a-mind, but does not receive any power from it in return, we pleted the picture. For if relationship were only a logicalmatter, there would indeed be no way to distinguish a causefrom its effect, since everything that implied something elsecould be implied by it in the reverse order. But when we addan ontological principle-the transmission of power from onething to another-we establish an irreversible direction, namely,the hierarchy of power mentioned a b ~ v e ' . ~RosAn continues byemphasizing the closeness of the connection between these twofactors, and adds that 'everything that exists must and has thepower to be related to something else. The only fundamentalkind of relationship there is, however, is that transference ofpower from one thing to another which may be expressed by alogical impli~ation'.~This scheme is applied to the interpretation of the whole causalprocess or btpyaa. xuKhtx$ which we considered in the last sectionwith interesting results, the most significant of which is that theidea of the return of the effect to its cause (perhaps the mostdynamic concept in the philosophy of Proclus) is viewed as being'essentially the logical connection between the cause and its effectbut viewed from the opposite dire~tion'.~Ros&n,op. cit. ch. iv, n. 15.RosAn, op. cit. p. 69.RosAn, op. cit. p. 69.Rosh, op. cit. p. 74.播放器加载中，请稍候...
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GERSH - Kinesis os. A study of spiritual motion in the philosophy of Proclus [IN] [proclo] PHILOSOPHIA ANTIQUAA SERIES OF MONOGRAPHSON ANCIENT PHILOSOPHYEDITED BYW. J. VERDENIUS AND J. H. WASZINKVOLUME XXVIS. E. GERSHKINHZIZ AKINHTOXA STUDY OF SPIRITUAL MOTIONIN THEPHILOSOPHY OF PROCLUSLEIDENE. J. B...
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